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lision with Horse and Buggy-Negligence
-Contributory Negligence-Refusing In-
struction, Error Made Harmless by Answers
to Interrogatories.
1. Where there is a general verdict for
plaintiff on a complaint or. declaration stat-
ing two causes of action and there is no
way of determining upon which cause of
action the verdict is based, it is error for
which a new trial should be granted to re-
fuse a properly tendered instruction for de-
fendant applying to either cause of action.
2. But where answers to interrogatories
in the record are such as would entitle
plaintiff to a judgment on a particular cause
of action stated, the general verdict will be
sustained as based by the jury on such
cause of action, and the refusal to give an
Instruction applying to another stated cause
of action will be regarded as harmless error.
3. One is liable for the damages oc-
casioned by driving his automobile at such
speed around the corner of intersecting city
streets as to enter on the left side of suclb
intersecting street and not to turn to the
right till too late to avert a collision with
a horse and buggy properly driven on that
side of the street in the opposite direction.
In such case negligence is predicated upon
four distinct violations of legal duty, name-
ly: 1st, failure to travel on the right side
of the street; 2nd, failure to turn to the
right until too late to avert the injury; 3rd,
failure to keep the automobile in control so
as. to slacken its speed or stop it if neces-
sary to avoid the collision; and 4th, failure
generally to exercise that degree of care
and caution commensurate with the in-
creased danger and duty incident to travel
at the intersection of two public thorough-
fares in the City of South Bend.
4. In such case a verdict will not be dis-
turbed on the ground or alleged contribu-
tory negligence of plaintig in quickly turn-
ing her horse to the right in an effort to
avert the collision, where it appears that
this is just what a reasonably prudent per-
son would have done in the circumstances.
or that such act of plaintiff was induced by
the imminent peril and fear in which she
was put by defendant's negligence as the
proximate cause.
Action in tort for personal injuries
by Mary McClelland against William
Meyers. From a judgment for plain-
tiff, defendant appeals.
Richard B. Swift and Thomas V.
Truder for Appellant.
Charles B. Mulholland and Edwin
C. Donnelly for Appellee.
OF NOTRE DAME
VURPILLAT, J. Appellant's auto-
mobile, driven by his son, collided
with the buggy of the appellee in
which she and her young daughter
were riding, and for the damages oc-
casioned thereby the appellee brought
action against the appellant in the
Notre Dame Circuit Court. The com-
plaint is in two paragraphs, the first
of which alleges in substance the fol-
lowing operative facts: that on
August 26, 1919, plaintiff, with her
young daughter, was driving lawful-
ly and carefully along South Bend
Avenue in the City of South Bend;
that at that time the defendant's son
was driving defendant's automobile
under the employment and direction
of defendant; that defendant's son
carelessly and negligently drove and
managed said automobile in front of
plaintiff's horse and buggy so as with
great force and violence to drive it
against the buggy of plaintiff, there-
by throwing plaintiff and her daugh-
ter out upon the hard pavement, by
reason of which plaintiff and her
daughter were injured and rendered
sick and disabled for six and eight
weeks respectively; that plaintiff
was, as the time of the collision, driv-
ing on the right side of the street in
the direction of her travel; that said
collision and damages were caused by
the careless and negligent conduct of
defendant's son while acting for the
defendant, and without any fault or
negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff. The second paragraph alleges
the same state of facts, but charges
the conduct of the defendant's son to
have been willful and malicious.
Defendant answered in general de-
nial addressed to each paragraph of
complaint, and the issues thus form-
ed were submitted to the jury for
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trial. A general verdict was return-
ed for the plaintiff, assessing her
damages at seven hundred and fifty
dollars. Appellant's motion for new
trial was overruled and judgment
rendered on the verdict.
Appellant assigns as error for re-
versal of the judgment, the overrul-
ing of the motion for new trial, that
the verdict is not supported by the
evidence and is contrary to the evi-
dence and the law.
Appellant assigns as error of the
trial court for which a new trial
should have been granted, the
court's refusal to give to the jury
defendant's instruction numberl
three which was properly tendered
The instruction reads as follows:
"If you find that the defendant had
knowledge of the situation requiring
the exercise of ordinary care and,
diligence to avert the injury; that
he had ability to and could have
avoided the resulting injury by the
exercise of ordinary care and dili-
gence; and that he did all within his
power to avoid and avert the collis-
ion, then your verdict should be for
the defendant."
This instruction is substantially
correct in its statement of the law
applicable to the second paragraph
of complaint. Wantoness is the
conscious failure by one charged with
a duty to exercise due care in the
discharge of that duty. Ellis v. Bir-
mingham Waterworks (Ala.) 65 So.
805; 29 Cyc. 509. The test for de-
termining whether there was wanton
and malicious infliction of the injury
complained of is the concurrence in
the case of these three elements,
namely: defendant's knowledge of
the situation requiring the exercise
of ordinary care and diligence to
avert the injury; defendant's ability
to avoid the injury by the exercise
of ordinary care and diligence in the
use of the means at hand; and de-
fendant's omission to exercise such
care and diligence to avert the in-
jury which, to the ordinary mind,
must apparently result from such
omission. Unless all three of these
elements concurred in evidence there
could be no recovery upon the second
paragraph of complaint. And ordin-
arily the appellant would have been
entitled to the giving of the instruc-
tion tendered.
Refusal to give a proper instruc-
tion tendered by a party is ground
for a new trial. Pennsylvania Co.
v. Miller, 35 Ohio St., 541-35 Am.
Dec. 630; Berlin v. Oglesby 65 Ind.
308; Maloy v. Bennett 15 Fed. 371;
unless the matter is contained in
other instructions Chicago etc. Ry.
Co. v. Ryan 165 Ill. 88-46 N. E. 208;
Cox v. Chicago Ry. Co. 95 Iowa 54-
64 N. W. 450; Cleveland etc. Ry Co.
v. Harrington 131 Ind. 426-30 N. E
37; or is not applicable to the evi-
dence or the issues in the case. Il-
linois Steel Co. v. McFadden 196 Ill.
344-63 N. E. 671; McGovern v. In-
terurban Ry. Co. 136 Iowa 13-111 N,
W. 412-13 L. R. A. (NS) 476;
Clowdes v. Fresco Flume etc. Co. 118
Cal. 315-50 Pac. 373. Appellantfs
instruction was applicable to the is-
sues -tendered on the second para-
graph of complaint, and appears not
to have been covered by any other in-
structions. It would seem therefore
that appellant was entitled to the giv-
ing of the instruction.
Where there is a general verdict
for plaintiff on a complaint or de-
claration stating two causes of ac-
tion, and there is no way of determ-
ininy upon which cause of action the
verdict is based, a refusal to give a
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proper instruction for the defendant
as to either cause of action is ground
for a new trial. Pennsylvania Co. v.
Miller, supra. And the judgment in
such case must be reversed for such
error, just as in the case where the
verdict is based on a complaint of two
or more paragraphs, one of which is
bad on demurrer. The Belt Ry. &
Stock Yards Co. v. Mann 107 Ind.
89-7 14. E. 893. In the appellant's
case, however, the jury returned
answers to interrogatories so clearly
establishing the right of the plain-
tiff, appellee, to recover upon her
first paragraph of complaint, that,
had the general been for the
appellant, appellee would have been
entitled to the judgment on such in-
terrogatories non obstante veredicto.
These interrogatories show con-
clusively that the general verdict is
based on the first paragraph of com-
plaint, and therefore they render
harmless any error that might have
been committed in refusing the ten-
dered instruction. Furthermore, we
think the instruction is defective. It
states elements of fact which, if
found, would relieve defendant from
liability only on the second paragraph
of complaint, but it directs the jury
to return a verdict for the defendant
regardless of plaintiff's right to re-
cover on the first paragraph of com-
plaint. There was no error in re-
fusing the tendered instruction, or in
overruling the motion for a new
trial for that cause. Wellston Coat
Co. v. Smith 65 Ohio St. 70-61 N. E.
143-55 L. R. A. 99; Chicago & St. L.
Ry. Co. v. Champion 9 Ind. App.
510-36 N. E. 221; Ryle v. McCormack
Harvester Co. 108 Wis. 81-84 N. W.
18-51 L. R. A. 906 Bagley v. Smith
10 N. Y. 489-61 Am. Dec. 756.
It remains to be determined wheth-
er the verdict of the jury on the first
paragraph of complaint is contrary
to the law and the evidence. The is-
sues tendered by the general denial
to this paragraph are the negligence
of the defendant and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. Upon
these issues the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving the negligence charg-
ed against the defendant. And, al-
though in most jurisdictions the
plaintiff is required to allege in his
complaint or declaration his own
freedom from contributory negli-
gence, in the courts of England, the
Federal courts and the courts of the
majority of the States, the rule is
that the burden of proof rests upon
the defendant to affirmatively estab-
lish as a defense the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. In Conn.,
Ill., Iowa, Main, Mass., Mich., N. H.,
N. Y. and Vermont, the exceptional
rule obtains that the plaintiff, to re-
cover, must establish his own free-
dom from contributory negligence as
well as prove the negligence of de-
fendant. As to the burden of proof
in negligence cases see 8 Encyc. of
Evidence 852; 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law (2nd Ed.) 453; Beach on
Con. Neg. (2nd Ed.) Ch. 15; 3 Elliot-
on Evidence Sec. 2500.
Although the issues of negligence
and contributory negligence ordin-
arily present questions of fact for
the jury to determine, these must be
considered and determined in the
light of the law. The advent of the
automobile did not change the law
of the American highway, nor did it
modify the general rules of the law
of negligence.
Negligence exists where one fails
to exercise due care towards another
as required by law, the party to whom
the duty is owing being thereby dam-
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aged. Chapin on Torts 499; Cooley
on Torts 279; 29 Cyc. 415 et seq.; 5
Words & Phrases 4743-4793. There
can be no fixed rule of law for de-
termining negligence in all cases.
The degree of care exacted by the
law in each case must depend upon
the conditions and circumstances of
the particular case. Penn. Ry. Co. v.
Coon III Pa. 430-440--3 Atl. 234;
Jacksonville, T. & K. Ry. Co. v.
Peninsular Land Co. 27. Fla. 157-
17 L. R. A. 33. Negligence is the
absence of care according to circum-
stances. O'Toole v. Pittsburgh &. L.
Ry. Co. 158 Pa. St. 99-22 L. R. A.
606.
What are the duties imposed by the
law of the American highway which
a failure to observe may constitute
negligence and entail liability for thr
resultant damages. The first rule of
the English common law of the high-
way is thus stated in an old rhyme:
"'Tis a law of the road,
Though a paradox quite,
If you keep to the left,
You'll always be right."
The rule in America is the oppo-
site and may be stated in rhyme as an
American parody to the English
paradox, thus:
'Tis the law of our road,
Not a paradox quite
Like the English turn left,
For we always turn right.
A prose statement of the rule in
this country is that travelers pro-
ceeding in opposite directions when
meeting must turn to the right. El-
liott on Roads & Streets 620. Tyler
v. Nelson 109 Mich. 37-66 N. W.
671; State v. Unwine 75 N. J. L.
500-68 Atl. 110; Luedtka v. Jeofrey
89 Wis. 136-61 N. W. 292. And it
has been held that this duty to turn
to the right applies to persons who
meet each other at any part of the
highway, whether at a crossing or
elsewhere. Cook Brewing Co. v.
Ball 22 Ina. App. 656-52 N. E. 1002;
Molin v. Wark 113 Minn. 190-129
N. W. 383. And as a general rule
each traveler must give half the road
Walkup v. May 9 Ind. App. 409-36
N. E. 917. But it is the right of the
traveler to occupy any part of the
track on the right side of the way
that he may choose. Brooks v. Hart
14 N. H. 307; Quinn v. O'Keefe 41
N. Y. Supp. 116. Each party has the
right to assume that the other will
obey the law, will turn to the right
and will exercise ordinary care and
prudence, and, so assuming, may de-
termine his own action accordingly.
Bager v. Zimmerman (Iowa) 161 N
W. 479; Vanderhorst Brew. Co. v.
Amrine 98 Md. 406-56 At. 833; An-
gell v. Lewis 20 R. I. 391-39 Atl.
521-38 Am. St. Rep. 881; Ballard v.
Collins 63 Wash. 493-115 Pac. 1050
The driver of an automobile and
the driver of a horse, whether on the
country road or on the city street
-whether at the intersection of city
streets or elsewhere, are both re-
quired to exercise such reasonable
care. prudence and diligence as the
circumstances demand. commensur-
ate with the existing danger. Bab.
bitt, Law of Motor Vehicles, 272;
Campbell v. Walver (Del.) 78 At!.
601; Cumberland Telephone Co. v.
Yeiser (Kv.) 131 S. W .1049; Arl-
ington v. Horner (Kan.) 129 Pac.
1159; Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown
165 Ind. 465-1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 238-
74 N. E. 615-6 Annotated Cc. 656-
18 Am. Neg. Rep. 392; Russ v.
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Strickland (Ark.) 197 S. W. 709.
The duty of the automobilist to drive
his car in a careful and prudent man-
ner implies that his car should be
equipped with brakes and so operat-
ed as to control the speed of the car
and stop it, if need be, to avoid col-
lision. Irving v. Judge 81 'Conn. 492-
71 Atl. 572; Owens v. Iowa Co.
(Iowa) 169 N. W. 388.
In the light of the foregoing pro-
positions of law let us consider the
facts of the case upon which the jury
based their finding of negligence
against the appellant. At the time
appellant's automobile, operated by
his son, collided with appellee's bug-
gy, the appellee was driving west in
South Bend Avenue on the right side
of the avenue, about seventy-five feet
from the intersection of St. Louis
Blvd. Appellant's automobile, com-
ing north in St. Louis Blvd., turned
east into South Bend Avenue. The
appellee, Mary McClelland, said that
she first saw the automobile when it
turned the corner; that the car was
traveling at a high rate of speed and
coming directly towards her; that at
the time she saw the car she was on
her right side of the street with her
buggy four feet from the curbing;
that as soon as she became aware of
the approach of the car towards her
she turned her horse farther to the
right; that when the collision occur-
red the right front wheel of the bug-
gy was against the curbing and her
horse was upon the parking beyond
the curbing. The testimony of
Grace McClelland, appellee's daugh-
ter, corroborated that of her mother
in substance. And, as showing the
point where the cQllision took place
and the position of the buggy and
the occupants after the collision,
these two witnesses were corrobor-
ated by the testimony of Mr. Ander-
son and Dr. Berteling.
Appellant's son, who drove the car,
admitted that appellee's buggy was
at all times on the right side of South
Bend Avenue on which she was trav-
eling; that he did not make an effort
to turn his car to the right till he
was within a few feet from appellee;
that when appellee turned her horse
farther to the right, the sudden turn
cramped the buggy and caused the
rear end to swerve towards the path
of the automobile; that the abrupt
turn of his car on the wet and slip-
pery street caused the rear of the
car to skid and collide with appellee's
buggy on its rear wheel. This is sub-
stantially the testimony of the two
workmen who accompanied appel-
lant's son in the car.
This evidence establishes four dis-
tinct violations of legal duty on the
part of the appellant towards the
appellee: First, failing to travel on
the right side or half of South Bend
Avenue; second, failure to turn his
car to the right, as he had ample
time and space to do, till it was too
late to avert the collision; third, fail-
ure to keep his automobile in control.
to slacken its speed, to stop it if
necessary, and to prevent its skid-
ding and colliding; and fourth, fail-
ure generally to exercise the increas-
ed care and caution commensurate
with the increased duty and danger
incident to travel and turning at the
intersection of these two public
thoroughfares of the City of South
Bend. The general verdict is sus-
tained by the record in its finding of
negligence against the appellant.
Appellant's counsel rather tacitly ad-
mit this negligence, for the burden of
their briefs is to sustain the charge
of contributory negligence against
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appellee. It is said by the court in
Ruter v Foy 46 Iowa 132, that when
the defendant seeks to establish con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff
as a defense, in so doing, he virtual-
ly admits his own negligence.
Burroughs on; Negligence, page
509, says: "Contributort negligence,
is such negligence on the part of the
plaintiff as to proximately cause the
injury complained of, superceding the
prior wrongful conduct of the defen-
dant and rendering him incapable of
averting its consequences. Plaintiff
cannot maintain an action for injur-
ies caused by negligence of defendant
if his own negligence contributed in
any degree to produce the result
complained of, unless the defendant
having knowledge of the plaintiff's
negligence, fails to use ordinary care
to avert the consequences; or the con-
tributory negligence of plaintiff is
caused by the sudden peril and terror
in the situation wherein he has been
placed." See also Cooley on Torts
679; Chapin on Torts 541; Nave et al
v Flack 90 Ind. 205.
As a general rule contributory neg-
ligence is a question of fact for the
jury to determine. Berry, Automo-
biles 151-152; 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law (2nd. Ed.) 456; 29 Cyc. 630;
Mathieson v Burlington, etc. Ry. Co.
125 Iowa 90-100 N. W. 51-16 Am.
Rep. 321; Christie v Elliott 216 111.
31-74 N. E. 1035-I L. R. A. (NS)
245-108 Am. St. Rep. 196.
The jury, by their general verdict
and their answers to the interroga-
tories, exonorated the plaintiff
from the charge of contributory neg-
ligence. Following are the interrog-
atories and answers bearing on this
issue: "I. When the collision occur-
red, was the plaintiff's horse and
buggy on her right side of the street?
Ans. Yes." "4. Was the plaintiff at
any time on her left side of the street,
-at the time of the collision, or dur-
ing the period immediately preceding
it? Ans. No." "5 Did the defend-
ant's son show negligence in failing
to turn to the right before he got
within a few feet of plaintiff's car-
riage? Ans. Yes."
The record discloses that plaintiff
was at all times conforming to the
law by traveling on the right side of
the street, and by driving in a care-
ful and prudent manner, having re-
gard for the safety of herself and
her daughter and doing all that a
reasonably prudent person could have
done to avoid the collision. Appel-
lant's contention is that plaintiff, by
turning her horse to the right and
thereby, as he alleges, causing her
buggy to swerve somewhat towards
the path of the automobile, approxi-
mately contributed to the injury. In-
stead of constituting an act of con-
tributory negligence, this conduct of
plaintiff shows a compliance with
the law of the road which reqlired
her to turn to the right, and it is just
what a prudent person would have
done to avert a collision made immi-
nent and unavoidafle by the negli-
gent and reckless conduct of the ap-
pellant's son in his palpable viola-
tion of the law in at least three par-
ticulars, already adverted to. But
if plaintiff's act be regarded as prox-
imately contributing to her injury
it was obviously induced by the dan-
ger and fear of the situation intc
which she was placed by the negli-
gence of the defendant.
We cite here three cases, the first
two of which bear striking analogy
in their facts to the appellant's case
all three of them being particularly
applicable to the issue of contribu-
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tory negligence, and all of them sus-
taining verdicts and judgments for
the injured parties. Molin v Wark
113 Minn. 190-129 N. W. 383-41 L.
R. A. (NS) 346; Irven v Judge 81
Conn. 492-71 Atl. 572; McIntire v
Orner 166 Ind. 57-76 N. E. 750-4 L.
R. A. (NS) 1130-117 Am. St. Rep.
359.
There is no error in the record and
the judgment of the trial court is
therefore affirmed.
WILSON v BIDDLE ET AL.
(No. 4)
Alleged Tort-Refusal of Principal and
His Agents to Convey Land-Contract-
Offer and Acceptance--Communication of
Acceptance by Principal to His Agents--
Acceptance of Another's Subsequent Offer
-Peremptory Instruction Directing Verdict
for Defendants--Constitutional Right of
Trial by Jury.
1. S., the owner of real estate in Indiana
resided in Illinois. His agents, B. & W.,
residing in Indiana, had authority to secure
a purchaser. They wrote to W., suggesting
that S.'s property was selling on certain
terms, stated. W. wired to B. & W.: "Ac-
cept proposition, bases your letter." B. &
W. replied by letter, disclaiming any au-
thority to make offer, but submitted W.'s
proposition to S. for acceptance. S. replied
to B. & W., authorizing them to accept the
offer and inclosed deed to be delivered to W.
Before communicating these facts to W.,
B. & W. received a better offer which they
also submitted to S. and which he accepted.
Sale was had and property transferred on
second offer. Held that W. had no right of
action, ex contractu or ex delicto.
2. No contract is formed where a prin-
cipal merely communicates his acceptance
to his agents, so long as neither principal
nor agent dispatches such communication to
the offeror.
3. An acceptor, principal, owes no duty
to the third person to accept his offer, but
is legally free to reject it and accept a sub-
sequent offer,--to sell his property to the
highest and best bidder.
4. The agent of such acceptor, principal,
although instructed by him to communicate
his acceptance to such third person, owes no
duty to such third person to carry out such
instructions, and is not liable to him for
nonfeasance in that respect.
5. In such case, where neither the prin-
cipal nor his agents owe any legal duty to
the plaintiff, their willful refusal to close a
contract with him and convey to him pro-
perty he offered to purchase is not an ac-
tionable tortious wrong.
6. On such a state of facts alleged by
plaintiff and established by the evidence, the
court should direct a verdict for defendants.
7. The constitutional guaranty of trial
by jury can be invoked only by one who has
a right of action at law.
Action by appellant, William Wil-
son, against the appellees, John Y.
Sherman and the firm of Biddle &
Wendt, for $1700 damages alleged
to have been sustained because of the
wrongful and fraudulent transfer of
certain real estate to another after
the appellant's purchase of the same
from appellees. From a judgment
for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Edwin W. Hunter and Harry P.
Nester for Appellant.
Francis J. Clohessy and Joseph P.
O'Hara for Appellees.
VURPILLAT, J. Marion Biddle
and William G. Wendt, as partnerq'
in the firm of Biddle and Wendt, had
,been collecting rents tor their co-de-
fendant, Sherman, who owned the
hotel property, cor. Michigan and
Colfax Sts. South Bend. Plaintiff
who resides in Elkhart, Indiana,
wanted to buy the property. Biddle
& Wendt wrote to plaintiff: "Sher-
man property selling at $7,000 cash,
or more than half cash, unless you
want to wire us $7100, at least $3500
cash, balance one year, 6 per cent."
Letter dated Sept. 2, 1919.
Next day, upon receipt of letter,
plaintiff telegraphed: "Accept propo-
sition, basis your letter. Am writ-
ing." Same day plaintiff wrote a,
follows: "I write to confirm my tele-
gram of this day and to add that as
soon as you get the papers and the
abstract, I will pay you the $3500
cash, and if you will make a fair dis-
count on the balance will pay all
cash."
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Biddle & Wendt wrote in answer to
this letter and telegram: "We have
yours of the 3rd, and have no doubt
the proposition will be accepted. Our
letter was not intended as a proposi-
tion but we believe it will go through.
The owner when here led us to be-
lieve he would take $7,000 and we
will urge its acceptance. We have
written Mr. Sherman at his home in
Chicago and enclosed deed for him
to execute, conveying the property
to you. We feel satisfied Mr. Sher-
man will accept and send the deed.
We will advise you when we hear
from him." On the same day Biddle
& Wendt did send a letter to Sher-
man, advising acceptance and the
return of deed of conveyance proper-
ly executed for plaintiff.
On September 9, Sherman replied
to Biddle & Wendt's letter and en-
closed' the deed properly executed
which would convey the property tc
plaintiff, with instructions to Biddle
& Wendt to accept the offer and de-
liver the deed.
By the time this letter arrived
with enclosure of deed, Biddle &
Wendt received from another person
an offer of $7300 for the property
and they immediately notified Sher-
man of this offer and enclosed new
deed to be executed in blank for the
insertion of the new purchaser's
name should they succeed in closing
deal with him, advised Sherman tc
execute it and suggested to him that
they would keep plaintiff in ignor-
ance of the new negotiations until it
was seen that they could not be com-
pleted. Sherman sent the new deed
and expressed the hope that the new
deal might be closed. Biddle &
Wendt closed the deal with the sec-
ond purchaser and then notified
plaintiff that Sherman had refused to
accept his proposition.
A complaint in three paragraphs
went out of the record on demurrer
and an amended complaint in one
paragraph was filed. This alleges
the facts to be substantially as above
stated, and made parts of the amend-
ed complaint by copy and reference
thereto the letters and telegram
quoted, except the second lettter of
Biddle & Wendt explaining to plain-
tiff that their Irst letter to him was
not intended as a proposition, but as
a suggestion which, if adopted,
would be forwarded to their co-de-
fendant, Sherman, for acceptance up-
on their recommendation. It is fur-
ther alleged that plaintiff's offer was
accepted by Sherman, who instruct
ed his co-defendants in writing to.
communicate such acceptance to
plaintiff and deliver to him the deed,
but that the defendants wrongfully
and fraudulently refused to transfer
the property so contracted for by
him, but instead, sold and transfer-
red the same to a third person for
$7300; that said property was pur-
chased by plaintiff of defendants as
a hotel site and that plaintiff could
not procure another. That by reason
of the wrong and fraud practised up-
on the plaintiff he was damaged in
the sum of $1700.
The defendants filed joint and sep-
arate demurrers to the amended
complaint. To the overruling of
these demurrers the defendants took
proper exceptions. Separate answer
in general denial was filed to the
amended complaint, and the issues
were submitted to the jury.
At the close of the plaintiff's case
in chief the court overruled a motion
of defendants to enter a nonsuit
against the plaintiff. At the conclu-
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sion of the defendants' case, the
court, over appellant's objection, per-
emptorily instructed the jury to re-
turn a verdict for the defendants;
which was accordingly done.
The appellant assigns as error fox
the reversal of the judgment the ov-
erruling of his motion for a new trial
the giving over his objection of the
peremptory instruction, that the ver-
dict is contrary to law and is not sus-
tained by sufficient evidence.
The evidence in the record disclos-
es no more facts than those alleged
in the amended complaint. The
amended complaint does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action in behalf of the appellant,
either upon the theory of breach of
contract or upon the theory of tort
by fraud. No facts are plead or
proven that show a primary substan-
tive law right in the plaintiff, or any
legal duty owing to him from the
defendants or any of them, and con-
sequently no facts that' constitute
breach of duty and violation of right.
In brief, none of the essential ele-
ments of a right of action is either
plead or proven. For this reason
the demurrer to the amended com-
plaint should have been sustained.
And for the same reason, any ver-
dict that might have been returned
for the appellant would have been
contrary to law and not supported
by sufficient facts, and the trial court
would have been obliged to set asid(
such verdict and grant a new trial.
It is just such a situation that war-
rants the court, indeed, that makes it
the court's duty, to direct the verdict
by peremptory instruction. Speak-
ing upon this point Justice Miller, in
Pleasants v Fant, 22 Wallace 116-22
L. Ed. 780, says: "Must the court go
through the idle ceremony in such a
case, of submitting to the jury the
testimony on which the plaintiff re-
lies, when it is clear to the judicial
mind that, if the jury should find a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, that
verdict would be set aside and a new
trial had ?"
This doctrine is approved and fol-
lowed by the Federal courts. Cough-
ran v Bigelow 164 U. S. 301-17 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 117-41 L. Ed. 442; Patten v
Texas etc. Ry. Co. 179 U. S. 658-21
Sup. Ct. Rep. 275-45 L. Ed. 361. See
also Felton v Spiro 78 Fed. 576. But
where, as contended by appellant's
counsel, there is legal evidence tend-
ing to sustain the material allega-
tions of the complaint, or where the
finding of facts depends upon the
credibility of the witnesses and upon
inferences and deductions to be;
drawn from the established facts, it
is an invasion of the province of the
jury for the court to direct the ver-
dict. Adams v Kennedy 90 Ind. 318;
Haughton v Aetna Life Ins. Co. 165
Ind. 32-73 N. E. 592. But see the
following Indiana cases which sus-
tain directed verdicts on account of
a failure of proof on the part of
plaintiff. Oleson v Lake Shore Ry.
Co. 143 Ind. 405-42 N. E. 736-32 L.
R. A. 149; Weis v City of Madison
75 Ind. 241-39 Am. Rep. 135. Judge
Elliott in his work on Evidence, Vol.
I Sec. 31 states the rule thus: "It is
settled that the question whether
there is any evidence or not upon an
issue or issues in a cause is a question
for the court. At first blush it 'may
seem that the doctrine that the court
must determine whether there is any
evidence trenches upon the funda.
mental principle that questions of
fact are for the jury, but upon closer
scrutiny it will be found that there is
no invasion of that principle. If in
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law there is no legal evidence, then
there is nothing for the consideration
of the jury and the whole question re-
solves itself into one of law. Ver-
dicts must rest on legal evidence and
by such evidence facts must be pre-
sented; if, therefore, there is no such
evidence the functions of the jury are
not called into exercise."
Appellant contends for the rule
that if there is any evidence at all in
support of his cause of action, the
court erred in directing the verdict.
In Hathaway v East Tenn. Ry. Co.
29 Fed. 4889, the court says: "De-
cided cases may be found where it is
held that if there is a scintilla of evi-
dence in support of a case, the judge
is bound to leave it to the jury; but
the modern decisions have establish-
ed a more reasonable rule, to-wit:
that before the evidence is left to the
jury, there is or may be in every case
a preliminary question for the judge
not whether there is literally no evi-
dence, but whether there is any upon
which the jury can properly proceed
to find .a verdict for the party pro-
ducing it upon whom the burden of
proof is imposed." Cudahy Packing
Co. v Marcan 106 Fed. 645; Cowles
v Chicago etc. Ry. Co (Iowa) 88 N.
W. 1072; Philadelphia etc. Ry. Co. '
Fronk 67 Md. 339-1 Am. St. Rep.
390! Anders v Life Ins. Co. 62 Neb
585-87 N. W. 331; McNaul v Arnold
177 Pa. St. 433-35 Atl. 672; Offutt v
Columbia Ex. 175 I1. 472-51 N. E.
651. Judge Elliott says: "The ad-
judged cases, and they are very
numerous, warrant the conclusion
that where there is nothing more
than a scintilla of evidence it is the
duty of the court to decide the case
and not submit it to the jury." El-
liott on Evidence Vol. I Sec. 32. Jones
(-I Evidence (2nd Ed.) 292.
The verdict of the jury was prop-
erly directed by the court, not only
on the ground of a failure of legal
evidence upon which to base a ver-
dict for appellant, but also on the
ground of a fatal variance between
the complaint and such proof as
there was. The prevailing theory of
appellant's complaint is fraud, while
the evidence introduced tends only tc
establish a breach of contract. In
Pomeroy on Remedies, page 554, it
is said: "These causes of action dif-
fer in substance. One is upon a con-
tract and the other in tort, and the
law will not permit a recovery upon
one by showing a right of recovery
upon the other." Jones on Evidence
295; Lowe v Turpie 147 Ind. 652-44
N. E. 259-47 N. E. 150-37 L. R. A.
233; Armcost v Lindley 116 Ind.
295-19 N. E. 138; Itenrk County v
Citizens Bank 208 Mo. 209-106 S. W.
622-14 L. R. A. (NS) 1052. Note 46
to 50 L. R. A. (NS) 14.
Appellant's counsel quote as a point
in their brief the provision of the In-
diana Constitution that "in all civil
cases, the right by jury shall remain
inviolate." Art. I, Sec. 20. The consti-
tutional right of trial by jury may
be invoked only by those who have a
right of action at law. Lynch v The
Railroad Co. (N. Y.) 29 N. E. 315.
Black on Constitutional Law, page
627, says: "Notwithstanding some
difference of opinion, it is now gen-
erally agreed that the right of trial
by jury does not include the right to
have the jury render a verdict in
case where the law is clearly againsi
the pltintiff. The jury are to try and
determine the facts, but it is the
court which must declare the law ap-
plicable to the facts. Consequently
when the judge, at the close of the
plaint.ff's evidence, orders a per-
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emptory nonsuit, on the ground that,
conceding all the facts which the
jury could find from the evidence,
those facts are not sufficient to es-
tablish a liability against the defend-
ant, such action is no violation of the
plaintiff's constitutional rights." The
Indiana Supreme Court, speaking of
this provision, in a case involving
peremptory instruction, says:
"Courts have guarded this right,
with scrupulous care, against any en-
croachment. In all cases triable by
jury the jurors are the sole and ex-
clusive judges of the facts proved,
and, of necessity, therefore, of the
witnesses, and of the weight to be
given to their testimony. Where up-
on a material point there is a failure
of proof in the evidence of the party
having the burden of an issue, the
court may, as a matter of law, in-
struct the jury in favor of the other
party to such issue. Where the facts
are admitted by the pleadings or
otherwise, or where the evidence up-
on the controlling question is docu-
mentary, and its interpretation and
construction a matter for the court
and but one conclusion deducible
therefrom, then in such cases, the
court may, as a matter of law, direct
a verdict in accordance with the evi-
dent facts, and in favor of the party
having the affirmative of the issue."
Haughton v Aetna Life Ins. Co. 165
Ind. 32-39-73 N. E. 592. Appellant's
case is just such as is here described
in the concluding language of the Su-
preme Court of Indiana: a case which
involves the interpretation and con-
struction of documentary evidence
by the court to determine, as a mat-
ter of law, whether or not appellant
acquired any contractual rights
against the appellees or any of them,
so that they can be said to have owed
the appellant some legal duty at the
time and under the circumstances
complained of, a breach of which
would give to appellant a right of ac-
tion against them. We do not think
the pleading and the proof establish
a right of action in the plaintiff,
either ex-contractu or ex delicto.
Any judgment rendered by the court
must be in observance of the funda-
mental principle secundum allegata
et probate. Phillips on Code Plead-
ing, See. 79. Neudecker v Kohlberg
81 N. Y. 296.
The letter of Biddle & Wendt of
Sept. 2, 1919, contained a definite of-
fer to sell to appellant the Sherman
property, and appellant's telegram
and letter confirming it constitute an
unconditional acceptance of the of-
fer; so that, as between these parties
themselves, a contract would result.
Anson on Contracts '22. Biddle &
Wendt, however, were not making
an offer for themselves. They did
not own the Sherman property.
Sherman is made a party defendant
as the owner of the property, and it
is obvious, therefore, that no contract
resulted, unless Biddle & Wendt had
authority from Sherman at the time
to make such offer. The second let-
ter of Biddle & Wendt to appellant,
properly admitted in evidence over
the objection of appellant, and the
subsequent transactions of the par-
ties, establish the authority of Biddle
& Wendt to procure and submit of-
fers to Sherman for his property. Ac-
cordingly Biddle & Wendt forwarded
appellant's offer to Sherman, who ex-
ecuted a deed which would convey
the property to appellant and sent
this deed to Biddle & Wendt, his own
agents, with written instructions to
them to close the deal and deliver
the deed. These are all the opera-
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tive facts in appellant's case, and
they are not sufficient to transfer the
property to appellant, or to form a
contract with him.
The deed was never delivered to
appellant, and delivery of a deed by
a grantor to his own agent, with in-
structions to deliver to the grantee,
is not a delivery to the grantee. Mad-
den v Cheshire Provident Institution
(Kan.) 94 Pac. 793. Williams v
Daubner 103 Wis. 521-79 N. W. 748;
Osborn v Eslinger 155 Ind. 355-58
N. E. 439; Morris v Caudel 178 Ill.
9-52 N. E. 1036-44 L. R. A. 489;
Mudd v Dillon (Mo.) 65 S. W. 973;
Ball v Foreman 37 Ohio St. 132.
Nor was the communication of
Sherman's intention to accept appel-
lant's offer ever made to appellant
by Sherman himself or by his agents.
Therefore no contract was formed.
Anson on Contracts. 17. As said in
Madden v Cheshire Provident Insti-
tution, supra, "Keeping in mind the
fact that (Biddle & Wendt) were
(Sherman's) agents and not (appel-
lant's) and that what one does
through and by an agent he does
through and by himself, it cannot be
said that the owner of the property
accepted the offer of (appellant), so
long as the acceptance was within his
control. It was as much in his con-
trol while in the possession of his
agents at (South Bend) as though
the deed which had been executed
and the letter of instructions to his-
agents had been left upon his desk
in (Chicago). So long as they were
in the hands of his agents they were
in his own hands." Where a property
owner instructed his agent to make
immediate payment of the premium
on a fire insurance policy which the
insurance company had offered him,
held, there was no acceptance of the
policy where payment of the pre-
mium was delayed by the agent till
after the fire. New v Germania Fire
Ins. Co. et al. 171 Ind. 33-85 N. E.
703. Having acquired no contract
rights against Sherman, the princi-
pal, and, of course, none against his
agents, the co-defendants, Biddle &
Wendt, it follows that the defendants
owed no duty to appellant; and since
they owed him no duty, he can main-
tain no action against them.
The complaint alleges that the de-
fendants "fraudulently iefused to
convey to the plaintiff the above de-
scribed property, but have sold said
property to another without the con-
sent or knowledge of the plaintiff."
These alleged facts are not fraudu-
lent but are clearly within the legal
rights of the defendants to do in dis-
charging their duties and subserving
their own interests. Biddle & Wendt
owed loyalty and good faith to their
principal, Sherman. To him alone
are they answerable for any failure
to carry out his instructions. They
were under no obligation whatever
to appellant. It is a general rule that
agents are liable to third persons for
misfeasance only, and not for non-
feasance. Therefore an agent is not
liable to third persons merely because
of his failure to perform a duty which
he owes to his principal. Tiffany on
Agency 382; Madden v Cheshire
Provident Inst., supra. "His liability
• . . is solely to his principal, there
being no privity between him and
such third person." Story on Agency,
Sec. 308; Chapin on Torts 171; Hen-
shaw v. Noble 7 Ohio St. 226; La-
badie v. Hawley 61 Tex. 177-48 Am.
Rep. 278. As a matter of good faith,
the agents, Biddle & Wendt, were
bound to inform their principal.
Sherman, of the highest and best bid
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or offer they might receive for his
property. Hegenmyer v. Mark 37
Minn. 6-32 N. W. 785-5 Am. St. Rep.
808. And the defendant, Sherman,
was under no obligation whatever to
accept appellant's offer for his pro-
perty, but instead was legally free to
sell to the highest and best bidder,
either directly or through his agents,
as he did in this case. The omission
to act, however, willful, is not action-
able unless there is a legal duty to
act. Ellis v. Birmingham Water-
works Co. (Ala.) 65 So. 805.
Defendants could not be liable for
depriving appellant of the benefits of
his alleged contract, for there was
no contract formed. Appellant ac-
quired no right in personcm against
the defendants, and therefore there
could exist no right of action ex con-
tractu. Neither could defendants
fraudulently deprive appellant of
such contract benefits, for fraud is a
tort founded upon the violation of
some right in rem which everybody
owes a duty to respect, and in ap-
pellant's case he had no such right
with respect to the alleged ocntract
and the defendants owed him no duty
in the premises. It has been held
that where a maker executes and de-
livers his promissory note to the
payee for an illegal consideration
known to both. and the payee nego-
tiates the note to a bona fide pur-
chaser who enforces collection there-
of from the maker. the maker cannot
recover from the payee on the alleged
ground of wrongful and fraudulent
transfer of the note by the payee;
for the reason that such payee owes
the maker no duty to retain such note
in his possession. Haynes v. Rudd
102 N. Y. 372-7 N. E. 287-55 Am.
Rep. 815; Koepke et al. v. Peper 155
Iowa 687-136 N. W. 902-45 L. R. A.
(NS) 773). The Iowa Supreme
Court, in the last case cited, in re-
versing a judgment for plaintiff, de-
clared that "the verdict should have
been directed for the defendant."
Finding no error in the record, the
judgment is affirmed.
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BRIEF OF HARRY P. NESTER IN CASE OF
WILSON v. BIDDLE et al.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
James Wilson, Appellant,
VS.
Marion Biddle and Win. G. Wendt,
partners in the real estate busi-
ness, and John Y. Sherman, Ap-
pellees.
Brief for Appellant.
By Harry P. Nester.
1. NATURE OF THE ACTION.
John Y. Sherman was the owner
of certain real estate located in the
city of South Bend, state of Indiana,
and rented such property through the
agency of Biddle and Went, his co-
defndants, who also collected the
rents for said property, and cared for
it generally.
James Wilson, the appellant, de-
siring to purchase property suitable
for a hotel site, entered into negotia-
tions with Biddle and Wendt for the
purchase of the Sherman property.
These negotiations took the form of
letters exchanged between the par-
ties litigant, and were introduced as
exhibits on the trial of the cause in
the lower court, but since the deter-
mining of their force and effect is s
vital issue in this case, they are set
out below:




362 S. Hill St.
Elkhart, Ind.
Dear Sir:-
Sherman property selling at $7000.
cash or more than half cash; unless
you want to wire us $7100., $3500.
cash, balance one year at 6 per cent.
Biddle and Went,
per Biddle.
The foregoing was a letter received'
by James Wilson from Biddle and
Wendt, immediately upon the re-
ceipt of which he telegraphed Biddle
and Wendt as follows:
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 2.
Western Union Telegram.
Biddle and Wendt,
501 M. S. Bldg.,
South Bend, Ind.
Accept proposition, basis your let-
ter. Am writing.
James Wilson.
And on the same day, further com-
municated with Biddle and Wendt by
the following letter:






I write to confirin my telegram of
this day and to add that as soon as
you get the papers and the abstract
I will pay you the $3500. cash, and if
you will make a fair discount on the
balance, will pay all cash.
Sincerely yours,
James Wilkon.
Several days later the appellant
received the following letter from
Biddle and Wendt:






We have yours of the third and
have no doubt the proposition will
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be accepted. Our letter was not in-
tended as a proposition, but we be-
lieve it will go through. The ownei
When here led us to believe he would
take $7000. and we will urge its ac-
ceptance.
We have written Mr. Sherman at
his home- in Chicago, and enclosed
deed for him to execute, conveying
the property to you. We feel satis-
fied Mr. Sherman will accept and
send the deed. We will advise you
when we hear from him.
Biddle and Wendt.
ler Biddle.
On the same day on which the fore-
going letter was written, Biddle and
Wendt did communicate with John
Y. Sherman, which letter is as fol-
lows:
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 4.
South Bend, Ind.
Sept. 4th, 1919.
Mr. John Y. Sherman,
Chicago, Illinois.
Dear John:
I am sending-you herewith a deed
transferring your propqrty at the
corner of Colfax and Michigan
streets in this city to a James Wilson
of Elkhart, one of the few customers
who have quickly responded to our
proposal sent out on the 2nd instant.
I believe he is sincere in his state-
ments as to the payment of money
which he sets forth in his letters sent
herewith and which kindly return to
us for filing in our records. Of
course it is up to you to decide on any
discount. We would encourage ac-
ceptance of this offer. In the mean-
time we will keep watch for any bet-
ter offer. Should one come we will




In reply to the above letter John Y.
Sherman wrote the following:






I am returning the deed for the
transfer of my property at the cornei
of Colfax Avenue and Michigan
Street to a man named Wilson.
Sincerely yours,
John Y, Sherman.
The appellant, believing that a
valid and binding contract had been
entered into between himself and the
co-defendants, tendered the purchase
price provided for, but Biddle and
Wendt refused to transfer and de.
liver the deed as ordered by Sherman,
and subsequently sold the property
to another person for $7300. because
of which the appellant was damaged
to the extent of $1500. which he seeks
to recover in this action.
2. ISSUES PRESENTED.
A complaint in three paragraphs
was filed, to which the defendants
demurred. Demurrer sustained.
Plaintiff then filed amended complain'
in one paragraph, alleging the facts
above set out, and asked for a ver-
dict of $1500. damages. Defend.
ants demurred to amended complaint.
and such demurrer being overruled
filed answer in one paragraph in
general denial. The cause being at
issue, trial was had by jury. At the
conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence,
the defendant moved the court to dis-
miss the action because of insuf-
ficiency of evidence, which motion
was denied. When the defendantt
had rested their case, the court gavr
the jury the peremptory instructions
to return a verdict in favor of the de-
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fendants, holding that the plaintiffs
cause of action had sounded in tort,
and since fraud had not been suf-
ficiently shown, they were not en-
titled to recover on their complaint,
Verdict was accordingly returned
in favor of the defendants.
3. ERRORS ASSIGNED AS
CAUSE FOR REVERSAL.
The appellant assigns as errors for
reversal of the judgment:
1. The verdict of the jury is not
sustained by sufficient evidence.
2. The verdict of the jury is con-
trary to the law.
3. The court erred in giving to
the jury over appellant's objection
the peremptory instruction to return
a verdict for defendants.
4. The court erred in overruling
appellant's motion for new trial.
4. CONCISE STATEMENT OF
THE EVIDENCE.
The witnesses introduced were sc
numerous, and the volume of testi-
mony taken was so great, as to pro-
hibit an exhaustive treatise in this
work. A brief resume is all that is
practical here. This we will endeav-
or to give.
James Wilson, the plaintiff, taking
the stand in his own behalf, testified
that he was a resident of Elkhart,
Indiana, and being desirous of pur-
chasing property for a hotel site, had
conferred with Biddle and Wendt as
to securing such a site. They in-
formed him that he would be noti-
fied if they found suitable property.
Later he (James Wilson) received a
letter from Biddle and Wendt, (In-
troduced in evidence as Plaintiffts
Exhibt No. 1) which contained, an
offer to sell him a certain property
owned by John Y. Sherman of
Chicago. He testified that he im-
mediately wired Biddle and Wendt
an unconditional acceptance of said
offer (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2) and
followed this telegram by a letter,
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3) in which
he further manifested his desire tc
buy the property offered at once
Wilson further testified that he has
ever been ready and willing to keep
the terms of the agreement, and on
two separate occasions went to the
offices of Biddle and Wendt to close
the deal, but they were unwilling to
do so, and put him off by stating
first that they had not received the
deed, and later, that it was improper
in form and would have to be rectified
before the deal could be closed. He
testified that when he learned later
that the prpoerty had been sold to
another man, he made diligent search
for property which would meet his
requirements and could be obtained
for the same price, but was.unable tc
locate such property, to his damage.
Marion Biddle next testified that
he was a member of the firm of Bid
dle and Wendt, and transacted mos!
of the business for said firm. He said
he had written James Wilson that
the Serman property was for sale
but denied that such letter was in-
tended as an offer. He acknowledged
the receipt of Wilson's letter and
telegram, and stated that he had re-
written Wilson (Defendant's Ex-
hibit No. 1), and that he had alsc
written to John Y. Sherman in
Chicago, (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4),
informing him of the opportunity tc
sell his property to Wilson, and had
enclosed a deed for Sherman to exe-
cute, conveying the property to Wil-
son. Biddle further testified that he
later received a reply from Sherman
(Plaintiffg Exhibit No. 5) ordering
him to close the deal with Wilson.
He admitted that a properly executed
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deed conveying title to James Wilson
was enclosed with this letter from
Sherman. He said that Wilson had
subsequently called at his office con-
cerning the property, but he (Bid-
dle), when questioned, could give no
satisfactory reason for his refusal to
deliver the deed to Wilson. Biddle
further testified that while the deed
was in his possession, he had held
himself open for other offers to buy
the property in controversy, and
finally secured a purchaser whc
bought the property for $7300.
John Y. Sherman was next called,
and testified that he was a resident of
Chicago, and owned the property at
the corner of Colfax Avenue and
Michigan Street in South Bend, In-
diana. He said that Biddle and
Wendt were his duly appointed
agents, with the power to dispose of
said property. He said that upon the
receipt of Marion Biddle's letter con-
cerning the sale of his property to
James Wilson, he had immediately
executed a deed conveying the pro-
perty to Wilson, and returned said
deed to Biddle with the instructions
to close the deal. He testified that
later he had received a letter from
Biddle requesting him to execute an-
other deed, conveying the property tor
one Drexel, which he had according-
ly done, and forwarded the deed to
Biddle.
William G. Wendt was next called
to give testimony. He said that hc
was a member of the firm of Biddle
and Wendt, but gave little attention
to the firms business matters, being
out of the city most of the time. He
appeared to know nothing of the
facts and circumstances which led to
this case, and was excused. The
plaintiff introduced Edward M. Dor-
an and Leo J. Hastings, who testified
that they were real estate men of
South Bend, Indiana. They both
testified that the present market
value of the property in controversy
was approximately $8500.00 and tes-
tified as to the scarcity of property
in any location which would serve the
plaintiffs purposes.
This is the substance of the evi-
dence introduced. Other minor wit-
nesses were introduced, but as their
testimony neither added to nor de-
tracted from the merits of the case,
we may safely disregard them.
5. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
In a consideration of this case,
there are.three outstanding questions
to be dealt with. They may be brief-
ly stated as follows:
1. The appellant and the appellees
entered into a good and binding con-
tract for the sale of the Sherman pro-
perty.
Anson on Contracts 57.
2. The trial court errer in giving
the peremptory instruction. 6 Encyc.
of Ev. 50; The City of New Albany v.
Ray 3 Ind. App. 321; Adams v. Ken-
nedy 90 Ind. 318; Haughton v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co. 165 Ind. 32.
3. The plaintiff proved sufficient
fraud to entitle him to a verdict.
Shaeffer v. Sleade et al. 7 Blackf.
178; Peter v. Wright et al. 6 Ind.
183; Pritchett v. Ahrens et al. 26 Ind.
App. 56; Friedmann et al. v. Camp-
field (Mich.) 52 N. W. 630; Williams
et al. v. Harris, Sheriff (S. Dak.) 54
N. W. 926.
6. ARGUMENT.
Proceeding in logical order, we
come first to the negotiations and
agreement entered into between the
appellant and Marion Biddle, which
forms the foundation of this action.
The lower court due to its perempt-
ory disposition of this cause, did not
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pass upon this issue, hence we dwell
upon it briefly. The contention of
the appellant that plaintiff's exhibits
1 and 2 form the basis of a good and
binding contract was disputed by the
appellees, who introduced Defend-
ant's Exhibit 1 to prove a revocation
of any offer which may have been re-
ceived by the appellant. In admit-
ting said Exhibit over the objection
of the appellant, the lower court com-
mitted its first error, for the subse-
quent execution of the deed proved
the existing contract, and estopped
the appellees from denying its force
and effect.- (Anson on Contracts
page 57, Chap. 2 Sect. 2) It is a
principle of law too fundamental to
admit of cavil that an offer cannot
be revoked by the offeror after its un-
conditional acceptance by another
person. The subsequent assertion of
Biddle, that his letter to the appel-
lant was not intended as an offer,
bears little weight. This is a ques-
tion for the court to decide, and not
one to be disposed of lightly by a
contracting party, as best suits. his
interests. If a person were permit-
ted to dispose of his contractual lia-
bilities by a simple denial, then every
commercial usage would be under-
mined, and unscrupulous persons be
held guilty of no greater offense than
bad faith.
As to the alleged failure of the ap-
pellant to prove sufficient fraud in the
court below, and as to the perempt-
ory instructions given by the court,
we may treat these two topics as one,
for a decision reached upon either,
automatically decides the other. The
question which now confronts us,
therefore, is, what is fraud, and what
degree of fraud must be proved to
entitle the plaintiff to a verdict of the
jury upon the facts of the case?
As early as 7 Blackford, 178, we
find the Supreme Court of this state
declaring that, "An action may be
maintained at law for false represen-
tations, made by a vendor to a pur-
chaser, of matters within the par-
ticular knowledge of the vendor,
whereby the purchaser is injured."
How could the acts of the appelle
Biddle be characterized, if not fraud-
ulent, where he, having a perfectly
executed deed in his possession, first
denies that he has the same, and then
later says that it is imperfectly exe-
cuted, and tells the appellant that he
must wait until such defect is remed-
ied? And during this time, while
Biddle had the appellant cleverly de-
ceived, the former was perpetrating
a double wrong, for not only was he
depriving the appellant of obtaining
possession of the land he had con-
tracted to buy and which Biddle had
been ordered to sell, but he was also
preventing the appellant from look-
ing elsewhere for a suitable location,
for the latter had implicit faith in
his contract, and took no measures
to protect himself, against the for-
mer's fraudulent designs. Which
facts make the decision of the court
in 6 Ind. 183. particularly applicable
to the case at bar; the court said,
"Where a party designedly produces
a false impression, in order to mis-
lead, entray, or obtain undue advant-
age over another-in every such case
there is a fraud, an evil act and an
evil intent,-Fraud may be deducted
not only from deceptive or false rep-
resentations, but from facts, inci-
dents, and circumstances which may
be trivial in themselves, but decisive
in the given case of a fraudulent de-
sign." 26 Ind. App. 56. "The denial
of that which has been previously af-
firmed constitutes fraud, where an-
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other who was induced to act by the
first statement, is thereby injured."
6 Encyc. of Evidence 50. If the facts
and circumstances in evidence are
such as to lead a reasonable man to
believe that fraud exists, that is all
that is required by the law.-54 N.
W. 926.
The act of the lower court in giv-
ing the jury the peremptory instruc-
tion to return a verdict for the de-
fendant, because of the failure to re-
turn a verdict for the defendant, be-
cause of the failure of the plaintiff
to prove fraud, was clearly done un-
der a misconception. The appellant
realizes that in many jurisdictions,
the rule laid down by the court would
apply, but an exhaustive research of
Indiana decisions will reveal the fact
that the local law differs from the
general rule. The "Scintilla of Evi-
dence Rule" as advanced by the ap-
pellant, ignored by the court, and
scoffed at by the attorneys for the
defense is nevertheless the law ap-
plied in Indiana-The appellee in
contesting the appellants motion for
a new trial, cited several federal
court cases which held this rule tc
be no longer in effect. Perhaps that
is true of federal courts, and may
even hold good in some state courts.
but as our own Supreme Court has
said in 165 Ind. 32, after applying
the "Scintilla Doctrine," "The rule as
to directing verdicts is different in
the federal courts from that. of the
Indiana Courts. When the judgment
of the judge upon the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain the verdict is
innoked by a motion for a new trial
then it becomes his duty under the
law to weigh the evidence for him-
self, and either to conform or over-
throw the conclusions of the jury, as
in his opinion the preponderence of
evidence may require. But until such
time as the matter may be thus
brought before him, the duty of
weighing the evidence must be left
to the jury where the law has placed
it.
That this rule has long been in
force is evident from the fact that in
an early case in 3 Ind. App. 321, we
find the court declaring that "It is
within the power of the trial court
to control the verdict by instructions
only when there is a total absence of
evidence upon some essential issue,
or where there is no conflict, and the
evidence is susceptable of but one in-
ference."
In 90 Ind. 318, the court said,
"Where, on the trial of a civil action
the plaintiff introduces evidence tend-
ing to sustain the material allega-
tions of his complaint, it is error for
the court to invade the province of
the jury, and instruct them to return
a verdict for the defendant."
6- Encyc. of Evid. 50.-Actual
fraud is a question of fact to be de-
termined by the jury from a con-
sideration of all the evidence before
them, and where the evidence, upon
the whole, to a reasonable degree of
certainty, tends to sustain the charge
of fraud, and should be submitted to
the jury.
In conclusion the appellant merely
wishes to point out to the court the
undisputable correctness of the cases
cited, and feels confident that a re-
view of these cases will convince thc
learned Supreme Court that the low-
er court erred in its decision, whicl
should accordingly be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
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BRIEF OF FRANCIS J. CLOHESSY IN CASE OF
WILSON v. BIDDLE et al.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
James Wilson, Appellant.
VS.
Marion Biddle and William G. Wendt
partners in the real estate business
doing business under the firm name
of Biddle and Wendt; and John Y.
Sherman, Appellees.
Brief for Appellees.
By Francis J. Clohessy.
The statement of the record as con-
tained in appellant's brief is correc
and requires no comment or amend-
ment from appellees.
We proceed at once to a statemen'
of the points and authorities relied
upon by appellees to sustain the judg-
ment and decision of the court:
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
I.
Fraud is a tort.
Shirk vs. Mitchell, 137 Indiana 185,
II.
Breach of contract is not a tort.
Shirk vs. Mitchell, 137 Indiana
185;
Rose vs. Hurley, 39 Indiana 77;
Denning vs. State (cal.), 55 Pac.
1000;
Carpenter Paper Case (Neb.), 87
N. W. 1050;
Barkley vs. Williams, 64 N. Y. Sup.
318;
Bouvier's Dictionary, Page 1215;
Words and Phrases, Page 7008.
III.
In order that plaintiff may recovet
judgment on his cause of action there
must be no variance and failure of
proof between the pleadings and the
evidence.
Bremmerman vs. Jennings, 101 In-
diana 253;
Armacost vs. Lindley, 116 Indiana
295;
Snaders vs. Hartge, 17 Ind. App.
243;
Lowe vs. Turpie, 147 Indiana 652;
Schilling Case, 57 Ind. 9pp. 131;
Pierce vs. Carey, 37 Wisconsin
232;
Henote vs. Bergman, 44 Florida
589;
Minneapolis Harvester Works
Case, 30 Minn. 399;
Degraw vs. Elmora, 50 N. Y. 1;
Note, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 14.
IV.
When a variance and failure of
proof exists between the pleadings as
set forth in plaintiff's complaint and
the evidence, the court has the power
and right, in fact is duty bound to
direct a verdict for the defendant.
Cincinnati Railway Case, 61 In-
diana 183;
Dodge vs. Gaylord, 53 Indiana 377;
Hynds vs. Hays, 25 Indiana 31;
Griggs vs. Houston, 104 U. S. 553;
Anthony vs. Wheeler, 130 Ill. 128;
Corning vs. Troy Factory, 44 N. Y.
577;
Carpenter vs. Huffsteller, 87 N. C.
273;
Johnson vs. Moss, 45 Cal. 515;
Volkening vs. DeGraf, 81 N. Y.
268;
Pendleton vs. Dalton, 96 N. C. 507;
Faulkner vs. Faulkner, 73 Mis-
souri 327;
Hackett vs. Bank, 57 Cal. 3-35;
Rothe vs. Rothe, 31 Wis. 570;
Bank vs. Schultz, 2 Ohio 471;
Goodlett vs. Louisville et all, 122
U:S. 391;
Grand Trunk R. R. Co. Case 18
Mich. 170;
Order of Chosen Friends Case, 64
Mich. 671;
Deyo vs. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 33 N
Y. 9;
Metropolitan R. R. Co., Case, 121
U. S. 558;
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Note in 2 L. R. A. 340;
Note in 85 American Decisions
706;
Note in 4 L. R. A. 778.
V.
There is always a preliminary
question for the judge whether there
is evidence upon which the jury may
properly proceed to find a verdict.
Metropolitan R. R. Co. Case 121
U. S. 558;
Hunt vs. Chosen Friends, 64 Mich.
671;
Beard vs. Railway Co., 79 Iowa
518;
Anthony vs. Wheeler, 130 Illinois
128;
Deyo vs. Railway Co., 34 N. Y. 9;
Achtenhagen vs. Watertown, 18
Wis. 331;
Ellis vs. Ohio Life Insurance Co.,
4 Ohio 628;
Jones on Evidence, Page
Thompson on Pleadings, Section
ARGUMENT.
Counsel for the Appellant have
presented such a full and able dis-
cussion of the issues had and evidence
offered at the trial of this case that
we are left nothing to add upon these
and content ourselves with offering
authorities to support the questions
of law as decided by the trial judge
and now involved upon this appeal.
These questions are set forth in this
brief under numerals I, II, III, VI,
and V.
Fraud, according to the authorities
is a tort. It is a civil wrong; an in-
jury inflicted otherwise than by a
mere breach of contract. A case not
precisely in point but in which this
rule was cited is that of Shirk vs.
Mitchell, 137 Indiana 185. The
learned judge in his decision said:
"The same transaction cannot be
characterized as a warranty and a
fraud at the same time. A warranty
rests on contract while fraud or
fraudulent representations have no
element of contract in them but are
essentially a tort."
It is said in Denning against State,
55 Pacific 1000, a California case:
"A tort is any wrong not consist-
ing in mere breach of contract for
which the law undertakes to give to
the injured party some appropriate
remedy against the wrong-doer."
Words and Phrases at page 7008
defines a tort as an injury inflicted
otherwise than by a mere breach of
contract.
Bouvier defines a tort in its legal
sense as a wrong independent of
contract.
It thus clearly appears that mere
breach of contract is not fraud. In
other words a breach of contract is
not a tort, fraud being a tort: The
appellant therefore failed in his
proof when he alleged fraud in his
complaint and offered evidence at the
trial which tended only to prove mere
breach of contract. The question
now arises as to whether or not this
variance between the pleading and
proof is such a failure of proof as
will permit the court to direct a ver-
dict.
An established rule. of pleading is
that a complaint must proceed upon
some definite theory or on that
theory which the plaintiff must suc-
ceed or not succeed at all. Appellant's
complaint proceeds upon a definite
theory, that of fraud. His proof,
however, only showed mere breach
of contract. This variance, accord-
ing to the highest court in this state
and leading decisions from other
states, is material and a failure of
proof sufficient to permit the dismis-
sal of the action.
Three Indiana decisions are in
point on this question. In Brem-
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merman vs. Jennings, 101 Indiana,
the Supreme Court held:
"That a plaintiff can succeed upon
the case made by his complaint and
not upon a different one; his evidence
must prove the substance of the issue
tendered by his pleading or he will
fail no matter what else he may
prove."
The court in Armacost vs. Lind-
ley, 116 Indiana 295, said:
"A party must stand or fall upon
the theory of his case as he presents
it in his pleadings. Recovery will
be upheld only when the evidence and
the facts found support the case
made by his complaint."
In Sanders vs. Hartge, 17 Indiana
Appellate 243, the Supreme Court in
discussing the same rule of law said:
"It is of the highest importance tc
the administration of the law that
courts should adhere most tenacious-
ly and strictly to the rule of pleading
which requires the pleader to be
bound by his cause of action as stated
by him, as otherwise his adversary
could have no assurance of the facts
he would have to controvert to meet
his attacks and would be taken in-
aware in the forensic encounter at
the bar."
A New York case, Ross vs. Mather,
51 N. Y. 108, is directly in point.
There the complaint alleges that the
defendant on selling to the plaintiff
a horse which was lame, warranted
and falsely and fraudulently repre-
sented that the lameness was in his
foot and nowhere else, and would
soon be well; that the plaintiff rely-
ing upon such warranty and repre-
sentations and believing them to be
true purchased the horse; that the
horse was not lame in his foot but
in his grambrel joint and was of lit-
tle value which the defendant well
knew. The plaintiff proved the wars
ranty and breach thereof but gave
no evidence tending to prove fraud
or any intention to deceive. The
court held that the basis of the action
was fraud, not a breach of warranty
and that the plaintiff could not re-
cover upon proof of the latter only.
In rendering this decision the courte
said:
"Where the complaint is for frauF
the general rule is that the plaintiff
cannot recover for a breach of con-
tract. The law never intended that
a party who has failed in the per-
formance of a contract merely should
be sued for a fraud or that a party
who had committed a fraud should be
sued for a breach of contract unlesf
the fraud was intended to be waived.
The two causes of action are entirely
distinct and there can be no recovery
as for a breach of contract where P
fraud is the basis of the complaint."
Jones on Evidence at page 29§
says:
"Where the proof fails to support
the allegations not in some particu-
lars only but in their entire scope and
meaning, and if the divergence ex-
tends to such an important fact or
group of facts that the cause of ac-
tion or defence as proved would be
another than that set up in the
pleadings it is not a variance but a
failure of proof which cannot be
cured by amendment and the action
must be dismissed."
Since the authorities are unanim-
ous in supporting the rule that the
variance between a complaint sound-
ing in tort and proof showing only q
mere breach of cQntract is material
and a sufficient failure of proof tc
warrant a direction of verdict, the
question now arises as to the power.
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authority and duty of the court tc
direct such verdict.
The power and authority of the
court to direct a verdict upon failure
of proof, that is, when the evidence
is deemed insufficient, is practically
absolute. Although such authority is
impliedly given by the very fact that
the existence of a material variance
and failure in proof is sufficient to
dismiss the action on trial, there are
many authorities expressly holding
that the court is vested with this au-
thority and power.
Perhaps the foremost case on this
question is that of Griggs vs. Hous-
ton decided by the United States Su-
preme Court and reported in 104 U.
S. 552. This case is one in which
the plaintiff sued a contractor. The
court dismissed the case on the
ground that the statutes in relation
to railroads did not apply to a con-
tractor engaged in building a road.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court held
that it was right and within the.
power of a court to direct a verdict
for the defendants where the evi-
dence was insufficient to sustain
plaintiff's cause of action.
The court in Anthony vs. Wheeler,
130 Illinois 128, said:
"The jury may be instructed to
find for defendant when plaintiff has
failed to prove some material point
in his case."
In Corning vs. Troy Factory, 44
New York 577, the court said:
"If the facts proved clearly fail
either to establish a cause of action
or a defence as a matter of law, the
court may direct a verdict."
Pomeroy on Remedies at page 554
writing on cause of action based on
contract and tort says;
"These causes of action differ in
substance. One is upon contract and
the other in tort and the law will not
permit a recovery upon one by show-
ing a right of recovery upon the
other."
According to some authorities not
alone is it the power and right of the
court to direct a verdict upon failure
of proof but it is the duty of the
court to so direct the jury.
In the leading case on this point.
that of the Metropolitan Railroad
Company vs. Moore decided by the
United States Supreme Court and'
reported in 121 U. S. 558, the court
said:
"If no evidence is offered or if it is
not such as one in reason and fair-
ness could find from it the fact sought
to be established the court ought not
to submit the findings of such fact tc
the jury."
A New York case, Deyo against
New York Central Railroad Com-
pany, 33 N. Y. 9, likewise is in point,
There the court laid down the doc-
trine to be that if the evidence is not
sufficient to warrant a verdict or if
the court would set aside a verdict
if found, it is the duty of the court
to nonsuit a plaintiff.
Appellant in his argument on ap-
peal lays much stress upon the scin-
tilla of evidence rule. The rule as
set forth in his brief has no bearing
upon this case in that it is an ex-
pression of the old doctrine now
obsolete.
Jones on Evidence at page - says
regarding the present day attitude
of courts toward the scintilla of evi-
dence rule:
"The recent decisions have com-
pletely exploded the old roctrine by
which a judge was compelled to sub-
mit the case to the jury if there was
a scintilla of evidence to support the
claim of the plaintiff. In place of
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this old rule has come the more rea-
sonable one, that in every case there
is a preliminary question for the
judge whether there is evidence up-
on which the jury may properly pro-
ceed to find a verdict. When the evi-
dence with all the inferences that the
jurs can justifiably draw from it is
insrfficient to support a verdict for
the plaintiff it is the duty of the
court to take the case from the jury
and to direct a verdict or grant a non-
suit as the facts of the case may war-
rant.
We might summarize the issues in
this appeal as they appear to the ap-
pellees as follows:
1. That fraud is a tort.
2. That breach of contract is not
a tort.
3. That plaintiff, now appellant,
failed in his proof when he alleged
fraud in his complaint and offered
evidence at the trial tending to prove
mere breach of contract.
4. That when such failure oi
proof exists the court has the right
and power, in fact is duty bound, tc
direct the verdict dismissing the ac-
tion.
5. That the scintilla of evidence
rule has been replaced by the more
reasonable rule that in every case
there is a preliminary question for
the judge whether there is evidence
upon which the jury may properly
proceed to find a verdict.
There is no error in the record.
Respectfully submitted,






Charles E. Duff, doing business as





Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Clifford O'Sullivan,
William J. McGrath,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
This is an action on a negotiable
instrument given by the defendant to
the plaintiff, which note is due and
unpaid. Demand $250.00.
The plaintiff files declaration in
two paragraphs.
Defendant files general demurrei
to plaintiff's declaration. Demurrer
sustained and plaintiff takes leave to
file amended declaration.
Plaintiff files amended declaration
in two paragraphs: (1) on the note
and (2) on the contract.
Defendant files plea in five para-
graphs: (1) non est factum; (2)
breach of contract; (3) payment;
(4) failure of consideration; (5) par-
tial failure and payment.
Plaintiff now files replication in
three paragraphs: (1) similiter to
defendants first paragraph of plea;
(2) confession and avoidance; (3)
general traverse.
Defendant now files traverse to
the second and similter to the third
paragraphs of plaintiffs replication.
The cause being at issue the jury
is impanelled and the cause is sub-
mitted and the trial had.
The defendant tenders three in.
structions in writing which' are re-
fused. The defendant excepts to the
court's ruling in refusing to give the
said instructions.
The defendant submits interroga-
tories numbered one to seven inclus-
ive, which interrogatories are given
as submitted.
Francis Walsh opens the argument
for the plaintiff, followed by Clifford
O'Sullivan for the defense. William
J. McGrath closed the defendant's
argument and the plaintiff's case was
concluded by Leo J. Hassenauer.
The court now instructs the jurN
in writing and files the instructions
and orders that they be made part of
the record without bill of exceptions.
The jury retires and returns into
open court their general verdict in
favor of the defendant and against
the plaintiff.
The jury also returns the inter-
rogatories and the answers thereto.
The plaintiff files motion for a new
trial which motion the court over-
rules, to which ruling the plaintiff
takes exception.
Judgment is rendered in favor of
the defendant and against the plain-
tiff.
The plaintiff prays an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame,
which is granted and five days are
given in which to file a general bill
of exceptions. Ten days are given to
the said plaintiff in which to file an
appeal bond in the sum of $250.00
which bond and sureties thereon are
hereby approved.




Marion Biddle et al.
Harry P. Nester,
Edwin Hunter,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Joseph Patrick O'Hara,
Francis Clohessey,
Attorneys for the Defendants.
This is an action for damages for
alleged fraudulent conduct in failing
to convey land to the plaintiffs by
the defendants under an agreement.
Demand $1500.00.
The plaintiff files complaint pre-
sumably in- three paragraphs: (1)
fraudulent transfer; (2) breach of
contract; (3) defrauding of benefits
of contract.
Defendants file motion to separate
paragraphs of complaint. Motion
sustained and complaint is separated
into three paragraphs and number-
ed.
Defendants file separate and sev-
eral motion to strike out parts of the
plaintiff's complaint as surplusage.
Motion sustained and matter striken
out.
Defendants file separate and sever-
al general demurrer to the complaint.
Demurrer sustained. Defendant
takes leave to file an amended com-
plaint.
Plaintiff files amended complaint
in one paragraph for fraud in de-
priving him of benefits of alleged con-
tract.
Defendants file separate and sever-
al demurrer alleging, (1) misjoinder
and (2) insufficiency. Demurrer
overruled.
Defendants file answer in general
denial.
Plaintiff files motion to strike out
part of defendants answer. Motion
sustained and defendants separately
except.
The cause being at issue the jury
is impanelled and the cause is submit-
ted to the jury for trial, and the trial
is had.
The plaintiff tenders five instruc-
tions in writing which are refused.
The plaintiff excepts to the ruling of
the court in refusing to give his in-
structions. Defendants tender per-
emptory instruction.
Harry P. Nester opens argument
for the plaintiffs followed by Joseph
Patrick O'Hara for the defense.
Francis J. Clohessy closed the argu-
ment for the defense and the case for
the plaintiff was concluded by Edwin
W. Hunter.
Court instructs the jury peremp-
torily to return a verdict for the de-
fendants.
The jury returns into open court
their general verdict in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff files motion for new
trial which the court overrules, tc
which ruling the plaintiff excepts.
Judgment is rendered in favor of
the defendants and against the plain-
tiff.
The defendant prays an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame,
which is granted and ten days are
given in which to file a general bill of
exceptions. Five days are given in
which to file an appeal bond in the
sum of $200.00 whcih bond and sure-
ties thereon are hereby approved.




John Green et al.
Ralph Bergman,
Emmett Rohyans,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Maurice F. Smith,
Leo B. Ward,
Attorneys for the Defendants.
This is an action on a promissory
note given by the defendants and
negotiated to the plaintiff, which note
is due and unpaid; demand $210.66.
The plaintiff files complaint in one
paragraph on the note.
Defendants file separate and sever-
al answer in four paragraphs: (1.)
general denial; (2) Breach of war-
ranty; (3) fraudulent negotiation tc
avoid defenses; (4) separate defense
of no consideration for suretyship of
Daniel Walker.
The plaintiff files a general and
several demurrer to each of the
second, third and fourth paragraphs
of answer. Demurrer overruled -as
to the second and third paragraphs
of answer. Demurrer sustained as
to the fourth paragraph of answer.
The defendant, Daniel Walker,
files cross-complaint in one para-
graph against William Hill and John
Green to be adjudged a surety on the
note.
The plaintiff William Hill and the
defendant John Green file general de-
nials to the cross-complaint.
The case being at issue the jury i-v
impanelled and the cause submitted
and the trial had.
The plaintiff tenders four instruc-
tions in writing which instructions
are refused.
The plaintiff takes exception to the
ruling of the court in refusing the
instructions. The defendant tenders
15 instructions all of which are re-
fused except numbers two, three and
six. The defendant takes exception
to the courts ruling in refusing to
give each and all of his instructions.
The plaintiff submits interroga-
tories numbered from one to five in-
clusive, all of which are submitted by
the court.
The defendants submit interroga-
tories numbered from one to nine in-
clusive, all of which are submitted
by the court except number two.
Ralph Bergman opens the argu.
ment for the plaintiff and is followed
by Marrice Smith for the defend-
ants. The defendants argument is
closed by Leo B. Ward and Emmett
Rohyans concludes the argument for
the plaintiff.
The. court now instructs the jury
in writing and files the instructions
and orders that they be made a part
of the record without bill of excep-
tions.
The jury retires and returns intc
open court their general verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for $212.00
against John Green as principal and
Daniel Walker as surety.
The jury also returns the inter-
rogatories and answers thereto.
The defendants file motion for new
trial which motion is overruled by
the court, to which ruling the defend-
ants separately take exception.
Judgment is rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against John Green,
principal, and Daniel Walker, surety.
in the sum of $212.00.
The defendant prays an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame,
which appeal is granted and ten days-are given in which to file a general
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bill of exceptions. Five days are
given to the said defendant in which
to file an appeal bond in the sum of
$200.00, which bond and the sureties
thereon are hereby approved.
CAUSE NO. 11.
The First National Bank of Chicago
VS.
The St. Joseph Loan and Trust Co.
Edward P. Madigan and
Delbert D. Smith,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Francis J. Murphy and
Walter R. Miller,
Attorneys for Defendant.
This is an action on two checks
each for $500.00, drawn on the
Mishawaka National Bank and trans-
ferred to the defendant bank for col-
lection, demand $1000.00.
Complaint in one paragraph for
money had and received on checks.
Defendant files answer in two para-
graphs: (1) general denial; (2)
confession and avoidance.
Plaintiff files motion to strike out
defendant's second paragraph of
answer. Motion sustained and de-
fendant excepts.
The cause being at issue, the jury
is impanelled, the cause submitted
and the trial had.
The plaintiff tenders two instruc-
tions in writing which are refused.
Defendant tenders four instructions
in writing which are refused. Plain-
tiff excepts to courts ruling in refus.
ing to give his instructions tendered.
Defendant excepts to courts ruling
in refusing to give his instructions
tendered.
The defendant submits interroga-
tories. numbered I to 5. The court
refuses all but numbers one and two.
Delbert D. Smith opens the argu-
ment for the plaintiff, followed by
Francis Murphy for the defendant.
Walter Miller closed the argument
for the defense and Edward P. Madi-
gan concluded the case for the plain-
tiff.
The court now instructs the jury
in writing and files the instructions
and orders that they be made part of
the record without bill of exceptions.
The jury retires and returns into
open court the general verdict in fa-
vor of the plaintiff fixing damages in
the sum of $1000.00.
The jury also return the interroga-
tories and the answers thereto.
The defendant files motion for new
trial which the court overrules, to
which ruling the defendant takes ex-
ception.
Judgment is rendered in 'favor o-
the plaintiff in the sum of $1000.00
The defendant prays an appeal tc
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
which is granted and ten days are
given in which to file general bill o '
exceptions. Five days are given t-
said defendant in which to file an ap-
peal bond in the sum of $1000.00,




George D. O'Brien and Clyde Walsh,
partners as O'Brien & Walsh
VS.
Charles M. Dunn
Alden J. Cusick and
Joseph H. Flick,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
James L. O'Toole and
Frank Francescovich,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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Action on account for legal services
rendered, demand $100.00.
Plaintiff files complaint on account,
with bill of particulars attached.
Defendant files demurrer to com-
plaint for want of facts. Court over-
rules demurrer to which ruling de-
fendant excepts.
Defendant files answer in three
paragraphs: (1) general denial; (2)
Payment; (3) Accord and satisfac-
tion.
Plaintiff files motion to require de-
fendant to elect between alleged in-
consistent defences. Motion over-
ruled to which ruling plaintiff ex-
cepts.
Plaintiff files reply to the 2nd and
3rd paragraphs of answer.
Defendant filed demurrer to the
reply which the court overrules, the
defendant excepting.
Jury is waived and the cause is
submitted to the court for trial and
the trial concluded.
Joseph H. Flick opens the argu-
ment for plaintiff, followed by Frank
Francesovich for the defendant.
James L. O'Toole concludes the argu-
ment for defendant and Alden J. Cu-
sick closes for plaintiff.
Court finds for the defendant upon
the 3rd paragraph of answer, accord
and satisfaction, and against the
plaintiff, that plaintiff take nothing
by his action and that defendant re-
cover his costs.





Andrew White and Samuel Small,
Partners as White & Small
VS.
Andrew Johnson
Andrew Johnson, the defendant,
in writing authorized the real estate
firm of White & Small, plaintiffs, to
sell a certain tract of real estate for
him at a stated price and on certain
terms also stated. The plaintiffs,
pursuant to such written authority,
entered into a written contract with
Whitcomb & Kellar for the sale of de-
fendant's said real estate. Plaintiff
executed said contract of sale as
agents for the defendant, referring
to themselves as agents in the body
of the contract and signing them-
selves as agents.
The sale thus contracted for, how-
ever, was so different in character of
price and terms and conditions from
the sale the defendant had authoriz-
ed plaintiffs to make, that he refused
to close the deal as thus mase and
ref usen longer to recognize the plain-
tiffs as agents and in fact discharged
them by letter expressly revoking
the agency. Later the defendant
and Whitcomb & Keller got together
and closed the deal and carried out
the hontralt on the terms and condi-
tions as stated therein.
Plaintiff demanded a commission
from defendant which was refused on
the ground that plaintiffs acted whol-
ly outside their authority in entering
into such a contract of sale, that he,
defendant, had refused to recognize
their action in making such a con-
tract, had in fact discharged them.
and was not liable to the mfor any-
thing he did subsequently, being free
to contract and transact for himself
in the sale of his land.
Should plaintiffs recover or not
and why?
Archibold Duncan and
Lewis L. Van Dyke
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.





The plaintiff contends in this case
that he was the procuring cause of
the sale and therefore entitled to
compensation for his services from
defendant.
The general rule is that a broker
has performed his contract and is
entitled to his compensation when he
is the procuring cause of the sale af-
fected with the purchaser, and the
rule is the same event though the sale
is affected by the owner himself.
In the case of Hoadley v. Savings
Bank of Danbury, 44 L. R. A. 321,
the broker merely called a person's
attention to a certain piece of prop-
erty, and gave him information as to
how to obtain admission thereto.
Later the owner, without the broker's
knowledge, took up the negotiation
and completed the sale. Here the
Conn. court held the broker the pro-
curing cause, and was entitled to
compensation.
Also in the case of Platt v. John, 9
Ind. App. 58. the same proposition
was applied. In this case the broker
secured a prospective buyer and in-
troduced him to his employer, which
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resulted in a sale between them.
Here the Indiana Supreme Court
said he was the "procuring cause"
and entitled to compensation.
The following citations support
this general proposition 62 Mich. 543.
93 Am. Dec. 718. 22 Am. Dec. 441.
"Mechan" on this proposition says:
"If an agent has done all that he un-
dertook to do, he is entitled to com-
pensation, even though the principal
receihed no benefits, or failed or re-
fused to avail himself of the advan-
tages secured. Thus a broker em-
ployed to effect a sale of property is
entitled to compensation when he has
found a purchaser ready, willing and
able to buy on the proposed terms,
even though the principal does not,
or cannot through defective title or
otherwise complete the sale."
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
1. An agency not coupled with an
interest may be revoked at any time.
John Alexander et al vs. Sherwood
Co. 77 S. E. 1027. This principle
shows that the defendant may dis-
charge the broker at anytime since
the broker is not coupled with an in-
terest.
2. If the broker attempts unsuc-
cessfully to effect a sale and his pro-
posed purchaser abandons the idea
of buying but is afterwards induced
to do so by the principal or by anoth-
er person without being in any way
induced by the broker, the latter is
not entitled to his commission. So
where the broker has had a reasona-
ble time in which to affect a sale and
does not do so the principal may com-
plete the sale and the fact that the
sale is made to the same customer
does not entitle the broker to his- com-
mission. Vol. 4 Amer. & English Law
2d. Ed. 978. Then in Crook et al. vs.
Forest, Ala. 1897 22 So. 540 It was
held in the opinion that a land owner
by employing a broker does not bar
his right to sell the land if he does it
in a fair and honest way and' if he
notifies his agent before the sale is
completpetd, further an agent cannot
recover for a commission if he does
not procure a party ready, willing
and able to buy on the terms and
price made by the principal. These
two authorities show that the defend-
ant in our case was entitled to revoke
the agency which he did with a letter
and sell the land to the customer if
does so with no intention of defraud-
ing the agent and there is no such
fraud alleged in the case before th,-
court. To support this contentior
further Mecham on Agency says pp.
964-9666: "The broker must show
before he can recover commission,
that he has completed his undertak-
ing according to its terms, or that its
completion was prevented without
his fault by the principal. What con-
stitutes a completion, however, is a
question of no little difficulty in many
cases, depending as it does upon va-
gue and indefinite agreements be-
tween the parties. The duty of the
broker is performed when he has
procured a purchaser ready, willing
and able to purchase upon the terms
specified or if no particular terms
are agreed upon, when he procurep a
purchaser to whom the principal
sells." As may be seen in our case
the terms were specified and the
agent was unable to procure a pur-
chaser who was able to purchase at
the price agreed upon and therefor
was discharged by a letter giving
him actual notice of his dismissal.





Action for Damages for Alleged
Assault and Battery.
Demand $500.
Mrs. Anna Jamison, the defendant,
was the owner of a number of tene-
ment flats which she rented, located
in the City of South Bend. For more
than a year her husband collected
the rents and accounted to her for
them, and during this year the plain-
tiff had been a tenant of Mrs. Jami-
son and had paid the rent to Mr.
Jamison.
On August 15, 1919, Mrs. Jamison
took from her husband the authority
to collect these rents, intending tc
appoint a firm of real estate agents
to collect her rents thereafter. On
September 1st, following, Mr. Jami-
son, notwithstanding the revocation
of his authority to do so, called as
usual to collect the rent from Mrs.
Hardesty. Mrs. Hardesty repre-
sented at the time that she was un-
able to pay the rent; because of her
refusal or inability to pay Mr. Jami-
son became quarrelsome and in fact
struck Mrs. Hardesty several times
in the face.
For this assault and battery Mrs.
Hardesty brings action against Mrs.
Jamison. Mrs. Jamison knew noth-
ing about her husband's attempt to
collect the rent on this occasion and,
after learning of it, immediately
communicated to Mrs. Hardesty the
fact that she had prior to the difficul-
ty with her husband taken from him
all authority to collect the rents, by
expressly forbidding him to collect
the rents September and thereafter.
Who should recover?
Clyde A. Walsh and
Henry W. Fritz,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.





A married woman may appoint an
Agent and her husband may be so
appointed: Section 48 Mechem on
Agency "Where a married woman is
competent to act by Agent her hus-
band may be appointed as the
Agent." Case of Shane v Lyons
(1898) 172 Mass. 199-51 N. E. 976,
70 Am. St. Rep. 261.
Court said in this case: "We see
no reason for regarding her as in-
capable of authorizing any act to be
done by him in her name, and her
behalf, or for shielding her from re-
sponsibility."
Married woman as principal-it
is now a settled principal of law that
a married woman may be a principal
and appoint her agent. Mechem on
Agency Section 42. Statutes in most
states have removed the common law
disability for married women and
she is clothed with the power to
manage to her own affairs, and cer-
tainly the power to appoint an agent
or attorney to do that which she is
capable of doing in person.
Notice of Revocation-upon revok-
ing the authority of a general agent,
the principal must give notice of re-
vocation to persons who have had
previous dealings with the agent as
such, or he will continue to be bound
by agent's acts.
The notice must be actual-and
must be extended to those who have
extended credit in reliance upon the
authority and general public notice
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to others. Mechem on Agency. Sec-
tion 117.
Court in Diversity v Kellog 114
Ill. Reports says: "Where a party is
shown to have been the agent of an-
other in a particular business or con-
tinues to so act within the scope of
his former authority it will be pre-
sumed that his authority still contin-
ues, and will bind his principal unless
the persons with whom he'acts have
been notified that his agency has
ceased.
Burns Revised Statutes. Section
5120 (1882) Removes the common
law disability of married woman in
this state and allows a married wo-
man to contract, appoint an agent.
Principals liability for Tort of
Agent-Mechem on Agency Sec. 98-
Both principal and agent are liable
for tort committed in scope of his
authority.
In the case of Bergman v Hen-
drickson 81 N. W. 304 The court said
that if the assault was committed for
the purpose of compelling payment
the servant was acting within the
scope of his employment and the
master was liable for plaintiff's in-
juries, though he may never have au-:
thorized such method of collection
and may have expressly probited it.
Mechem on Agency page 135 Sec.
253 says: "The older cases hold the
principal not liable to third persons
for the agent's wilful and malicious
acts, but the modern rule is that he is
liable for these also if the agent com-
mitted them while he was acting in
the execution of his agency and with-
in the scope of his authority.
Cases supporting this: Singer Mfg.
Co. v Rahn 132 U. S. 518. Southern
Express Co. v Brown Am. St. Rep.
306 (67 Miss. 260).
In 90 N. Y. 77 Judge Earle says:
"It matters not that he exceeded the
powers conferred on him by his prin-
cipal and that he did an act which
the principal was not authorized to
do so long as he acted in scope of au-
thority and line of duty, or being en-
gaged in the service of the defendant,
attempted to perform a duty pertain-
ing which he believed to that service.
In 116 Ill. App. 80 the Court held
that principal was liable for assault
of agent in attempting to collect an
installment due on furniture sold by
the principal to the complainant.
Supporting this C. B. & Q. R. R. v
Bryan 90 Ill. 126.
Vol. 21 R. C. L. page 846- A duty
rests upon every man in the manage-
ment of his own affairs whether by
himself or by his agents or servants
so to conduct them as not to injure
another, and that if he does not do so,
and another is thereby injured, he
shall answer for the damage. 1 Atl
709-91 Am. Dec. 425.
Page 94 Cyc. of Law Vol. 5. It is
sufficient to make the master liable if
the wrongful act of the servant was
committed in the business of the mas-
ter, and within the scope of his em-
ployment, even if he departed from
the instruction of the master.
It is an old rule of law that "where
one of two innocent persons must
suffer for acts of another, the person
who caused or set in motion the
agency will be held liable.
Case of 109 Fed. 369-45 N. Y. 549-




The doctrine that in order that the
principal not be bound by the acts
of an agent whose authority has been
revoked, notice must be given to
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third parties, has no application in
this case.
20 N. W. 476 .... "The doctrine
that a discharged agent can bind his
principal to the extent of the author-
ity with which he was apparently
clothed has no application beyond
the claims of the agent."
Even if the authority of the agent
had not been revoked, this principal
would not be liable for the assault.
There is a clear-cut distinction be-
tween torts of the agent which are
merely negligent and unskillful and
those which are in themselves ma-
licious, intentional and unlawful.
McManus vs. Cricket (1 East
160) . . . . "When a servant quits
sight of the object for which he was
employed, and without having in
view his master's orders, pursues
that which his own malice suggests,
he is no longer acting in the pur-
suanse of the authority given him
and his master is not liable for sulh
act."
It is clearly beyond the authority
of an agent who has the mere author-
ity to collect rents, to assault and
batter a tenant.
82 S. W. 552 .... "The defenhant
is not liable for the assault of his col-
lecting agent upon the plaintiff, the
agent in so hoing not being about his
master's business and not acting
within any authority delegated to
him by the master. To assault and
beat a creditor is not a recognized or
usual means resorted to lor the col-
lection of a debt nor is it one calcu-
lated to bring about a settlement."
137 Pac. 428 .... "A merchant is
not liable for the act of his general
canager authorized to collect for
goods sold and to recover goods
wrongfully taken, in assaulting a cus-
t)mer to whom he has gone to collect
for goods which he claims were tak-
en by the customer."
56 Hun. 506 .... "A drayman sent
by the purchaser to get some goods
from the warehouse of the defendant
objected to receiving certain damag-
ed packages and was assaulted by
the employe of the defendant who
was sent by the defendant to superin-
tend the loading of the goods. It
was held that the defendant was not
liable for the assault as the employe
was acting outside the scope of his
authority.
CAUSE NO. 7
Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago &
St. Louis Railroad Company
vs
John Hamilton
Action for Collection of Stock
Subscription.
FACTS
Defendant signed and delivered to
the plaintiff's agent, the following
written instrument:
"We, the undersigned, agreed to
pay fifty dollars ($50) for each
share of stock stated and annexed to
our names, to be paid in installments
of 5 per cent levied every sixty days
by the Board of Directors of the
Company. No assessment is to be
made till the subscriptions amount to
the sum of $600,000. The railroad
is to be constructed within a mile of
the subscriber's place."
Defendant signed and opposite his
name set "50 shares."
The $600,000 was later fully sub-
scribed and the Board of Directors
levied the assessments upon the sub-
scribers to be paid every sixty days.
The defendant refused to pay his sub-
scriptions, because, as the facts are,
John Doe, the company's agent who
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solicited the subscription and to
whom the paper was delivered, be-
fore and at the time of the signing
of the subscription, stated to defend-
ant that defendant would not be re-
quired to pay any money on his sub-
scription till the railroad was built-
till the road was constructed and,
worked in that county; that the road
had not been constructed in that
county; .that he, the defendant, re-
lied upon the statements of the com-
pany's agent thus made and signed
and delivered the instrument in ac-
tion on the belief that no money
would have to be paid thereon till the
i-oad was constructed; that he, de-
fendant, was induced by such state-
ment to make the subscription and
that, but for such representation of
the company's agent, he would not
have signed the instrument; that this
fraud of the agent procured the sub-
scription, and that, therefore, plain-
tiff should not recover on the sub-
scription in action.
Donnelly C. Langston and
George D. O'Brien,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.





(Indiana Rule). It is a general
rule that extrinsic or parole evidence
is not admissable to contradict, vary,
add to, substract from, or otherwise
modify the terms of a written instru-
ment. 17 L. R. A. 273; 6 L. R. A. 33;
6 Ind. 656.
Quotation from Wigmore, Vol. 4.
Par. 2439: "It may be added that the
term 'fraud' must here be understood
in its legitimate, narrow sense, i. e.,
a misrepresentation of a past or
present fact; for, although a much
looser significance has been occasion-
ally intimated, yet it is obvious that
an intent not to perform a promise
(i. e., a misrepresentation as to a fu-
ture fact), or a subsequent failure
knowingly to perform an extrinsic
agreement not embodied in the writ-
ing, cannot be included in the term
'fraud.' It seems to be a disregard.
for this distinction that is in part re-
sponsible for the anomalous attitudc
of the Pennsylvania court towards
the general rule."
Referring to the foregoing quota-
tion 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 434, says:
"The only cases which have been dis-
closed holding that fraud of this gind
is sufficient to warrant the allowance
of parole evidence are those of Penn-
sylvania."
Where a man, who can without dif-
ficulty read, executes a paper without
reading it, trusting to the party to
whom it is executetd for a statement
of its contents, or trusting to the
reading of it by the latter, there be-
ing no substantial reason shown for
not reading it himself, he will be
guilty of negligence. (37 L. R. A.)
64 Ind. 120; 73 Ind. 198; 106 Ind.
406.
Thornburgh vs. Newcastle & Dan-
Ville R. R. Co. (14 Ind. 6) "Reliance
cannot be placed upon the statements
of a soliciting agent for stock of a
railroad company, that the terms of
the subscription, that the subscriber
is asked to sign, provided for pay-
ment in money or supplies."
The foregoing citation presents the
attitude taken by the courts of this
state, as regards the contracts made
by the soliciting agent of a railroad.
It presents the court's attitude as to
contemporaneous oral agreements
and the rule in this state, as to the
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introduction of such agreements is
clearly stated in 121 Ind. 6. "Evi-
dence of prior or contemporaneous
agreement is not admissable to con-
tradict, or vary the terms of a writ-
ten instrument or contract."
According to Hughes on Evidence,
Page 238, it is conclusively presum-
ed that all extrinsic or parole agree-
ments have been merged into the one
written contract of the parties. Since
this is a conclusive presumption, pa-
role may not be introduced to in any
way change the written contract.
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
1. Fraud is a false representation
of fact, made with a knowledge that
it is false, or in reckless disregard as
to whether it is true or false, made
with an intention that it should be
acted upon, and actually inducing one
to act thereon to his damage. Anson
on Contracts 199.
(a) Corporation liable for repre-
sentations of its agent selling stock
Fifth Ave. Bank v Ferry Co. 19 L.
R. A. 331; Jewett v Valley R. Co. 34
Ohio 601.
(b) If corporation seeks to enforce
subscription obtained by promoter,
it will be bound by fraudulent repre-
sentations made by the promoter to
induce the subscription. McDermott
v Harrison 30 N. Y. 324.
2. Nothing indefinite or suspicious
about agent's statement and defend-
ant was not bound to investigate.
(a) Uarole evidence is admissable
to prove fraud induced the giving of
the subscription. Haynes v Moore
17 L. R. A. 272; 6 L. R. A. 45.
(b) The mere fact that the con-
tract is reduced to writing will not
prevent its being set aside for fraud
in procuring it. Boyce v Grundy 28
U. S. (Pet.) 120
(c) Whether the representation is
of opinion or of fact is a question to
be decided by the jury and not by the
court. Banta v Savage 12 Nev. 151.
3. Opinion cannot be relied upon
unless so made as to intentionally de-
ceive by putting the person off his
guard and inducing him to act on it.
Jackson C Collins 30 Mich. 557.
(b) If the false statements are of
matters peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the person making them and
are affirmations of fact, the other
party has a right to rely on them.
Rouer v Truant 83 Va. 397-54 Am.
Rep. 60.
(c) Case in point. Statements made
concerning the happening of a future
event cannot be relied on to avoid a
subscription obtained by an agent,
unless they are made fraudulently,
with an intention to deceive. Jeffer-
son v Hewitt 95 Cal. 535; Armstrong





Action for Damages, $1000, for in-
juries due to Defendant's alleged
negligent driving of his automobile
into plaintiff.
Plaintiff, while crossing the street
in South Bend, was struck by the
automobile of defendant driven at
the time by the defendant himself.
Defendant crossed the street without
obtaining the traffic policeman's sig-
nal or leave to cross, and while thus
crossing and without warning, ran
into plaintiff, causing injuries which
occasioned doctor and hospital bills,
loss of time from work, to the extent
of $200.
After the injury the plaintiff met
and settled their case in this manner:
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defendant agreed to give to plaintiff
his certain described horse and buggy
which plaintiff then and there agreed
to accept in full settlement and com-
promise of the plaintiff's right of
action against defendant.
Despite the fact of this agreement
in settlement, plaintiff brings this
action and defendant seeks to bar
the action by pleading the agreement









The right 'of plaintiff to recover
damages for injury.
24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 557, Kentucky.
50 So. 449, Louisiana.
188 S. W. 638, Kentucky.
The facts show accofd without
satisfaction which cannot constitute
settlement.
Buchart v. Barger, 114 Ind. 553-
17 N. E. 125.
McKeon v. Reed-12 Am. Dec. 319
-Kentucky.
Young v. Jones-18 Am. Rep. 279
-Maine.
Russell v. Lytle-22 Am. Dec. 537
-New York.
Brooklyn Bank. DeGrauw et al.
35 Am. Dec. 569 New York.
Hoxie v. Empire Lumber Co.-41
Minn. 548.
Also the following decisions sus-
taining the above proposition.
97 S. E. 90.
45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062.
77 Atl. 874.
159 N. W. 717.
171 S. W. 939.
155 Pac. 246.
114 Pac. 1106.
Accord and Satisfaction defined as
an executed agreement.
Bully. Bull -43 Conn. 455.
Continental Gin Co. et al. v. Arn-
old, 153 Pac. 160-Okla.
Must put in statu quo, then can re-
cover-
5 R. C. L. 899.
Swan v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co.-168
N. W. 659. North Dakota.
Accord without satisfaction only a
bar where so stipulated.
Binder v. Altman, 210 Ill. App. 237.
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
The rule that a promise to do an-
other thing is not a satisfaction is
subject to the qualification that where
the parties agree that the new prom-
ise shall itself be a satisfaction of
the prior debt or duty and the new
agreement is based upon a good con-
sideration and is accepted in satis-
faction-then it operates as such and
bars the action.
Goodrich vs. Stanley-24 Conn.
613 holds that an acceptance of a new
and valid promise which can be en-
forced in substitution of an existing
claim may be as effectual a satisfac-
tion and extinguishment of such
claim as the acceptance of any other
thing. Cases.
Smith vs. Elrod 24 So. 994.
Allison vs. Abendroth 15 N. E.
606.
Nassay vs. Tomilson 42 N. E. 715.
Langhead vs. Frich Coke Co. 58
A new promise is evident in this
Atl. 685.
case. Whitaker agreed to the pro-
mise made by Swanson (my client)
whereby he would give up his right
of action to sue for damages upon
the new agreement to accept a horse
and buggy in compromise.
Other cases.
Munley vs .Vermont Mut. Ins. Co.
62 Atl. 1020.
Palmer vs. Yager, 20 Wis. 91.
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CRIMINAL PRACTICE COURT
(Harry E. Denny)
Be It Remembered, That at the
February Term, 1920, of the Crimi-
nal Practice Court of Notre Dame,
the sophomore lawyers of the College
of Law practising therein, the follow-
ing record was made:
Court convened pursuant to law
with the regular judge and officers
in attendance, namely: Judge, Fran-
cis J. Vurpillat; Clerk, Arthur C.
Keeney; Sheriff, Frank M. Hughes.
The following proceedings were had
and orders made, to-wit:
In re Jury Commissioners: The
court appointed as Jury Commission-
ers for the year 1920 E. M. Kennedy,
J. F. Heffernan, two resident house-
holders of Notre Dame, Indiana,
and legal voters therein, good
and lawful men, known to be of op-
posite political party affiliations.
Come now the said appointees and
qualify as such jury commissioners
by taking and subscribing the oath
as such.
In re Grand Jury: The Jury Com-
missioners, including the Clerk of the
court, ex-officio, having met pursuant
to law in the discharge of their
duties, come now into court and re-
port their action, to-wit: the selec-
tion in manner and form as prescrib-
ed by law of the following nabed per-
sons as Grand Jurors, for the Febru-







good and lawful men, householders
and legal voters of Notre Dame
Indiana.
Proceedings of the Grand Jury:
Joseph Doran and
Harry E. Denny and
Mark Storen,
Prosecuting Attorneys.
Bernard V. Pater and
Aaron H. Huguenard,
Attorneys for Defendants.
Upon the issuing and service of a
grand jury subpoena the following
witnesses were examined before the
grand jury, to-wit: Edwin J. Mc-
Carthy, Charles E. Butterworth,
William A. Miner, Paul V. Paden,
Eugene M. Kennedy, Alfonso A.
Scott, Charles M. Dunn.
The following is the state of facts
evidenced by the testimony intro-
duced before the grand jury: Jack
Johnson and John Smith planned to
break into the house of Ben Franklin
for what they might find. On the
evening of June 1, 1919, they went to
the home of Ben Franklin. Johnson
stood outside on guard while Smith
went to the house and tried the door.
Just as Smith was about to insert a
skeleton key in the door lock, Mrs.
Franklin opened the door, shrieked
with fright and fled through the
house and out at the back door.
Smith immediately entered the
house and took a watch and chain
from the table. At that moment
Johnson gave a warning from out-
side and Smith ran from the house,
taking with him the watch and chain
and he and Johnson ran down the
street together.
The next evening they went to the
house of John Brown, telling him
how they got the watch and chain
and asked him to assist them in dis-
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posing of them. Brown took the
watch and chain and two days later
the three men went to the pawn shop
of Ike O'Brien in Misawaka and
there pawned the watch and chain.
The watch was a Boss filled gold
case with an H. H. Taylor movement
inside and a gold chain attached.
worth twenty-six dollars and be-
longed to Mr. Ben Franklin.
The grand jury returned into open
court their indictment based on this
state of facts, charging John Smith
with larcency in the first count, Jack
Johnson with larcency in the second
count and John Brown with receiv-
ing stolen goods in the third count.
The court, on motion of the prosecut-
ing attorneys, ordered the clerk to
issue bench warrant for the imme-
diate arrest of the defendants.
Comes the Sheriff into open court
with the three defendants named un-
der arrest and makes return of his
warrant.
The three defendants by their at-
torneys above named moved separate-
ly and severally to quash each count
of the indictment on the following
grounds stated: 1st, for misjoinder
of count three against John Brown
for receiving stolen goods with
counts one and two against Smith
and Johnson for larcency; 2nd, for
insufficient facts alleged to constitute
a crime against the defendants or any
of them.
After argument upon the motion
to quash, the court sustained the mo-
tion and the indictment was quashed.
The defendants, however, were not
discharged, but the grand jury was
recalled and the cases again submit-
ted to them, and after deliberation,
the grand jury returned into open
court their second indictments in the
cases, to-wit: one indictment in one
count against John Smith and Jack
Johnson charging them jointly with
the crime of larcency; and the second
indictment in one count charging
John Brown with the crime of re-
ceiving stolen goods. A motion to
quash was made in behalf of defend-
ants John Smith and Jack Johnson
which was overruled, and to which
ruling the defendants separately ex-
cepted.
The case was submitted tn the jury
(class) for trial upon the above facts
assumed as proven. The arguments
were made, by the attorneys above
named and the jury retired to de-
liberate upon the case and arrive at
their cerdict.
The case against defendant John
Brown for receiving stolen goods was
continued.
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ONLY OUR OWN OPINION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS.
(Validity of Conscription Act)*
by
Francis J. Vurpillat.
"NOTE: This paper was read before The Round Table of South Bend, Indiana,
and before the classes in constitutional law prior to the rendition of the decision by
the United States Supreme Court, sustaining the Conscription Act. The paper is
here presented in its original form, by request, on account of its controversial char-
acter and legal-brief style, the subject-matter of constitutional law and war powers
being ever new to students of the law.
The subject, the validity of the
Conscription Act, necessarily pre-
sents a legal question. But it is at
once a question intensely interesting
to the layman as well as to the law-
yer, because of its vital importance
to the nation in this world-war crisis,
to the General Government in its
powers to cope with an unscrupulous
and dangerous enemy, to all the citi-
zens in their rights and conditions
affected, and especially to the mil-
lions of young Americans who must
answer their country's call to serve
as soldiers and, if need be, die in this
unprecedented war on foreign battle-
fields.
That we may clearly understand the
points for and against the Conscrip-
tion Act we must keep in mind the
peculiar nature of our government,
national and state, and its constitu-
tional history. Under the Articles of
Confederation, before the adoption of
the Constitution, the states were
sovereign, completely independent
and bound together only by a league.
But as stated by Chief Justice Mar-
shall, in McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316-4 L. Ed. 579, "'in order
to form a more perfect union', it was
deemed necessary to change this al-
liance into an effective government,
possessing great and sovereign pow-
ers." By the adoption of the Con-
stitution national sovereignty passed
from the States to the United States.
nation and government. It is said by
the Supreme Court of the United
States that "The only Government of
this country which other nations
recognize or treat with is the Govern-
ment of the Union, and the only
American Flag known throughout the
world is the Flag of the United
States." Fong Yue Ting vs. U. S.
13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016-37 L. Ed. 905.
The United States, therefore, pos-
sesses the character of a sovereign
nation. The Constitution confides tc
the General Government plenary con-
trol over all foreign relations. A
large measure of the internal sover-
eignty or local government is left
to the states, subject, however, to the
express provision in the Constitution
itself that this Constitution and the
laws and treaties made pursuant
thereto "shall be the supreme law of
the land."
We come now to consider whether
the United States as a sovereign na-
tion, under the Constitution, has th
power to enact the Conscription Act,
which shall operate as the supreme
law of the land, binding upon all the
citizens of the country even those
who are for the time serving as mem-
bers of the State militia. True it is
that the Federal Government has only
such powers as are expressly or by
necessary implication granted to it
by the Constitution, and that all
powers not so granted to the General
Government are reserved to the
States and the people. But what is
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the rule of constitutional construction
that must be applied in determining
the powers of the United States?
In construing the commerce clause
of the Constitution in the case of Gib-
bons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1-6 L. Ed.
23, Chief Justice Marshall laid down
the rule of construction which has
ever since been adhered to. The
Chief Justice said: "This instrument
contains an enumeration of powers
granted by the people to their govern-
ment. It has been said that these
powers ought to be construed strictly.
But why ought they to be so con-
strued? Is there one sentence in the
Constitution which gives countenance
to this rule? . . . What do the gentle-
men mean by a strict construction?
. . . If they contend for that narrow
construction which, in support of
some theory not to be found in the
constitution, would deny to the gov-
ernment those powers which the
words of the grant, as usually under-
stood, import, and which are consist-
ent with the general views and ob-
jects of the instrument; for that nar-
row construction which would cripple
the government, and render it un-
equal to the objects for which it is
declared to be instituted, and to which
the powers given, as fairly under-
stood, render it competent; then we
cannot perceive the propriety of this
strict construction, nor adopt it as
the rule by which the Constitution is
to be expounded. . . . We know of'no
rule for construing the extent of
such powers, other than is given by
the language of the instrument which
confers them, taken in connection
with the purposes for which they
were conferred."
This opinion of Chief Justice Mar-
shall and the rule of construction
here stated, we would respectfully
urge upon the consideration of the
gentlemen who would cripple the na-
tional government in th defeat of
the Conscription Act by means of thai
strict and narrow construction of the
Constitution which is here so vigor-
ously condemned.
In the absence of any express'grant
of power to Congress to declare war
and to raise and maintain armies by
any means it may deem necessary and
proper, we submit that such power
exists as a necessary attribute to
sovereignty, and must be construed
to have been conferred by the very
act of the creation of the United
States Government in the adoption of
the Constitution. Self preservation
is not only the first law of nature,
but of nations as well. To make war
and -peace with other nations is uni-
versally recognized as a legitimate
exercise of external sovereignty; and
this power necessarily implies the
power to raise and maintain armies
and navies to that end by any means
that the sovereign power may adopt.
Speaking of the Louisiana purchase
and the acquisition of Florida and
Alaska, Black, in his work on Consti-
tutional Law, says: "The power can-
not be derived from any narrow or
technical interpretation of the Con-
stitution. But it is necessary to
recognize that there is in this coun-
try a national sovereignty. That be-
ing conceded, it easily follows that
the right to acquire territory is inci-
dental to this sovereignty. It is in
effect a resulting power, growing
iecessarily out of the aggregate of
powers delegated to the national
government by the Constitution."
If sovereignty in itself be not suf-
ficient to sustain the Conscription Act
as a war measure of the United
States, it must, however, exert a
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strong influence in the construction
to be put upon the enumerated war
powers granted to Congress by Sec-
tion 8 of Article I of the Constitution,
which are as follows:
To declare war, grant letters of
marque and reprisal and make rules
concerning captures on land and
water;
To raise and support armies; (ap-
propriations therefor to be made for
two years at a time) ;
To provide and maintain a navy;
To make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval
forces;
To provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections and re-
pel invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming
and disciplining the militia and for
governing such part of them as may
be employed in the service of the
United States.
These powers are expressly grant-
ed, are absolute and without any limi-
tation or restriction whatever as to
the means by which they may be ex-
ercised. And to these powers must
be added the provision that "the
President shall be the commander in
chief of the army and navy of the
United States and the militia of the
several states when called into the
actual service of the United States," a
provision which VonHolst's Constitu-
tional Law declares, invests the presi-
dent, as such commander, with all the
power which the King of England en-
joyed as the commander of the land
and naval forces of the United King-
dom.
Concerning these war powers it is
said in Black's Constitutional Law
that "the power to declare war neces-
sarily includes the authority to prose-
cute the war, and make it effective,
by all and any means, and in every
manner, known to and exercised by
any independent nation under the
rules and laws of war as the same arc
ascertained by the principles of in-
ternational law. Justice Field, in the
case of Miller vs. United States II
Wall. 268-20 L. Ed. 135 says: "It is
evident that legislation founded upon
the war powers of the government,
and directed against the public ene-
mies of the United States, is subject
to different considerations and limi-
tations from those applicable to legis-
lation founded upon the municipal
power of the government. . . . Legis-
lation (founded on the war powers)
is subject to no limitations, except
such as are imposed by the law of
nations in the conduct of war. The
war powers of the government have
no express limitations in the constitu-
tion, and the only limitation to which
their exercise is subject is the law of
nations." In Stewart vs. Kahn (II
Wall, 493-20 L. Ed. 17) the Supreme
Court says: "The measures to be
taken in carrying on war and to sup-
press insurrections are not defined.
The decision of all such questions
rests wholly in the discretion of those
to whom the substantial powers in-
volved are confided by the constitu-
tion." In construing the enumerated
power granted to Congress "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers," Chief Justice
Marshall said:
"We think the sound construction
of the Constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion,
with respect to the means by which
the powers it confers are to be car-
ried into execution, which will en-
able that body to perform the high
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duties assigned to it, in the manner
most beneficial to the people. Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the Con-
stitution, are constitutional."
In the light of the principles and
rules enunciated, and with the guid-
ance afforded us by the eminent au-
thorities cited, let us proceed to a
construction of the constitution neces-
sary to sustain the validity of the
Conscription Act.
In addition to the unrestricted
powers granted to Congress to raise
and support armies, to provide and
maintain a navy, and to make rule.
for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces, for the pur-
pose of waging any war it may de-
clare, Congress also is given the,
power "to provide for calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, to suppress insutrections and
repel invasions" and "to provide for
organizing, arming and disciplining
the militia. . . ." It is the attempt
to construe this added power over the
state militia for domestic purposes,
into a limitation upon the absolute
and unrestricted powers of Congress
over all its citizens for war purposes,
that furnishes the only apparent ob-
jection to the Conscription Act. We
say apparent objection advisedly, for
it is not a real objection.
True it is that, when Congress calls
forth the militia for the purely do-
mestic purposes enumerated in the
constitution such militia cannot be
made to serve beyond the territorial
limits of the United States. The Su-
preme Court has so held. But these
decisions must be considered as hold-
ing simply this, and nothing more.
They can have no application to the
Conscription Act, because that act is
not founded upon the militia clause
of the Constitution at all. The Con-
scription Act is a legitimate exercise
of national sovereignty, and is found-
ed upon the war powers expi'essly
granted in the Constitution, and calh-
forth all the citizens of the country,
without discrimination for the pur-
pose of raising and maintaining an
army to wage a foreign war already
upon us. Mr. George W. Wicker-
shaw, as Attorney General of the
United States, speaking of an Act of
Congress, of date March 27, 1908,
founded upon the militia power,
which attempted to authorize the
President to call the militia for use.
and when so called, to serve either
within or without the territory of the
United States," said: "If this pro-
vision were to be construed to au-
thorize Congress to use the Organized
Militia for any other than the three
purposes specified, it would be un-
constitutional." This opinion is said
to militate against the Conscription
Act. But note the language of this
eminent lawyer: "If this provision
is to be construed to authorize Con-
gress to use the Organized Militia."
Organized Militia being capitalized,
clearly having reference, therefore,
to the Organized Militia as such. The
Conscription Act does nothing of the
kind and bears no similarity to the
act construed by Mr. Wickersham.
Furthermore, we are informed that
the one-time Attorney General, at the
recent meeting of the American Bar
Association stated that his official
opinion applied to an act founded on
the militia power of Congress, and
could have no application to the Con-
scription Act which is based solely
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upon the other war powers of Con-
gress. Thus, all this argument and
citation of authority brought to the
attack of the Conscription Act, must
fall before the irrefutable logic of the
country justice of the peace, that
"they have no bearance on the case."
In the case of Burroughs vs. Pey-
ton, 16 Gratton 475 the militia is de-
fined as "a body of men composed of
citizens occupied temporarily in the
pursuit of civil life, while an army is
said to be a body of men whose busi-
ness is war." Why should the militia
of the state be recognized as having
any greater right than other citizens
of the United States? Why should
they be exempted from the call of
their country in time of national peril
and disaster? Are they any less citi-
zens of the United States because
they are militia? What divine right
of the State or what inalienable
character of its militia, exempts such
citizens from their country's call to
arms that every other citizen in the
land must answer? To so construe the
powers of congress as to give abso-
lute exemption to the state militia, is
to put it into the p6wer of the state
to thwart the powers of Congress al-
together; for, if a state may make
militia of some of its citizens it may
make militia of all. Thus would all
the war powers of congress be made
nugatory, except, indeed, the so-
called power to raise a volunteer
army, and this exception, we submit,
is a rank contradiction in terms-
power to raise a volunteer. To raise
this absurd contention to the dignity
of a constitutional construction would
be to transform the already vanish-
ing war power of Congress to a mere
glimmering hope that some patriots
might volunteer to come to the rescue
of their helpless country. The state
has no such power, and the citizen,
merely because he happens to be a
member of the state militia, has no
such exemption. The Constitution of
the United States and the Conscrip-
tion Law enacted pursuant thereto,
are the supreme law of the land, "any
thing in the constitutions or !.ws of
any state to the contrary notwith-
standing," as so prescribed in this
very language of the Constitution it-
self.
The Constitution makes no provis-
ion whatever for a national militia.
There is no such thing; and whoever
uses that phrase commits error. In
lieu of such national militia, Con-
gress is empowered to call the state
militia to serve the same purposes in
the nation that they are organized tc
serve in their respective states. The
militia is a peace organization for do-
mestic purposes only. The Constitu-
tion does make provision for a Na-
tional Army. Congress is empowered
to call all the citizens of the United
States to serve the same purposes as
any army in the world may be made
to serve its nation. The National
Army is a war organization for the
purpose of waging war. There are
two express powers affecting the
militia, as such, for the domestic pur-
poses enumerated. There are four
other express powers affecting the
citizens, as such, and these are for
purposes of war. No necessary rela-
tion exists between these militia
powers on the one hand and the four
war powers on the other hand. No
conflict need be invited in the process
of their construction. Indeed such
conflict can be and should be avoided.
In the absence of the two provisions
relating to the militia, no difficulty
would arise in the construction of the
four war powers first enumerated in
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the constitution which establish the
power of Congress to raise an army
by calling all its citizens. Why, then,
should the two provisions that follow,
granting added power to Congress
over an entirely distinct subject mat-
ter, be construed as a subtraction
from or a limitation upon the war
powers already enumerated and
granted without an "if".
In no important case has the dis-
cretionary power of Congress over
the means to be employed in the exe-
cution of any of its enumerated pow-
ers been denied by the Supreme
Court of the United States and a fixed
and arbitrary rule of construction ap-
plied instead. Nor will such a rule
of construction be adopted in this
case to deny the sound discretion ex-
ercised by Congress in the enactment
of the Conscription Act. "It would
have been an unwise attempt," says
Chief Justice Marshall (McCulloch
vs. Maryland) "to provide by im-
mutable rules, for exegencies which,
if foreseen at all, must have been
seen dimly, and which can be best
provided for as they occur." Justice
Strong, in the second Legal Tender
Decision, says: "It was at such a
time and in such an emergency (Civil
War) that the Legal Tender Acts
were passed. Now, if it were certain
that nothing else would have sup-
plied the absolute necessities of the
treasury, that nothing else would
have enabled the government to main-
tain its armies and navy, that nothing
else would have saved the government
and the Constitution from destruc-
tion, while the Legal Tender Acts
would, could any one be bold enough
to assert that Congress transgressed
its powers." Anent the war powers
of Congress the United States Su-
preme Court already has given ex-
pression to a strong opinion in the
Tarbel's Case 13 Wall. 408-20 L. Ed.
601. In this case the court said:
"Among the powers assigned to the
government is the power to raise and
support armies. . . . Its control over
the subject is plenary and exclusive.
It can determine without question
from any state authority how the
army shall be raised, whether by
voluntary enlistments or forced draft
the age at which the soldier shall be
received and the period for which
he shall be taken ,the compensation
he shall be allowed, and the service
to which he shall be assigned."
But what of the contentions against
the validity of the Conscription Act 5
The cardinal rule to be observed in
the interpretation of the constitution
is that effect must be given to the in-
tention of the people who adopted it.
And this intention must be ascer-
tained from the instrument itself,
from the very language used to ex-
press that intention. If this language
does not plainly import the intention,
if indeed, it be ambiguous, then re-
sort may be had to the expressed pur.
poses for which -the instrument was
adopted and the government was es-
tablished. If ambiguity still remains,
then, and not until then, have we a
right to consider matters extraneou
of the constitution itself in aid of itf
interpretation.
We strenuously deny that any
ambiguity exists as to the nature or
extent of the war powers granted to
Congress in the Constitution. The
language used in the grant of these
powers is so plain and unequivocal
that "he that runs may read." These
powers appear in four enumerations
of Sec. 8, Article I. ante, each with-
out a word, phrase, clause or sen-
tence, qualifying or restricting the
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power, as for instance, the power "to
declare war" and "to raise and sup-
port armies."
The only contention against the
Conscription Act which is based upon
any construction of the language of
the Constitution at all, is the persis-
tent fallacy of construing the Act as
an exercise of power over the state
militia in virtue of the separately
enumerated grant of such power, in-
stead of construing it, as Congress
expressly declares it to be and as it
clearly is, an exercise of the war
powers in virtue of the four enumer-
ated grants of power for such pur-
pose. We have already adverted to
this. The enumerated powers of Con-
gress over the state militia also need
no aid in their construction. Their
language too is plain and unequivocal.
In the absence of any declaration of
war by Congress and the enactment
by it of a law such as the Conscrip-
tion Act for raising a national army,
neither Congress nor the President
can call and use the state militia, as
such, for purposes other than those
enumerated in the Constitution,
namely: "to execute the laws of the
Union, to suppress insurrection and
repel invasions." That the militia,
who are mere peace officers, have al-
ways been recognized as having im-
munity from service "outside the
realm" is admitted, and that "such
immunity was a thousand years old"
in Great Britain before the adoption
of our Constitution. But that any
citizen of any civilized country under
the sun since the dawn of time ever
held immunity from his country's call
to war, we emphatically deny. Even
England, as is well known, has used
her citizens as soldiers for the prose-
cution of wars, both offensive and
defensive, everywhere throughout
her whole history, despite the much
vaunted immunity of the militia.
And the acts of Parliament declaring
such wars and raising armies to wage
them did not constitute any amend-
ments to the so-called British Con-
stitution, but were the legitimate and
frequent exercise of the sovereign
power inherent in every organized
government, whether autocratic or
democratic.
The debates in the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 are palpably per-
verted and misapplied In argument
against the Conscription Act. That
convention was created by Congress
to amend the Articles of Confede-a-
tion, but it found that instrument so
defective as not to admit of correc-
tion. The convention, therefore,
abandoned altogether the purpose for
which it was called, and instead,
adopted the Constitution which it re-
ported to Congress with the recom-
mendation that it be referred to the
States, to be by them in turn sub-
mitted to the people for adoption. In
this manner was the United States
Government established. So inher-
ently defective were the Articles of
Confederation that they were thus
rejected as an entirety. And the one
defect that stood out more promi-
nently than all the others, was the
utter inadequacy of power in the
United States Government to wage
war and to raise and support armies;
the utter inefficiency of the state
militia as a war organization upon
which the General Government was
made to depend. To obviate for all
time this defect, which almost proved
fatal to the success of the revolution
and to our independence, and to make
of the United States under the Con-
stitution a powerful nation, equal in
sovereignty to every other state in
the international world, there were
adopted by that Constitutional Con-
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vention the four unrestricted powers,
namely: to declare war, to raise and
support armies, to provide and main-,
tain a navy, and to govern the land,
and naval forces. The intention of.
the patriots who framed the Con-
stitution and the people who- adopted
it is to be derived from the plain lan-
guage used by them to express that
intention and to create the power
granted, and not by resort to any
individual construction put upon the
conflicting statements made in con-
vention debate. And yet, there are a
few men insisting in this manner
upon such a construction of the Con-
stitution as will make the United
States of today still dependent upon
the state militia and, in fact, more
impotent and inefficient than it was
under the Articles of Confederation,
-a contention so palpably absurd as
to provoke -derision and contempt.
The real solution of the militia and
war power controversy in the Con-
stitutional Convention is this: No
national militia was created at all,
but instead the states were permitted
to retain their respective militia and
the General Government empowered
to call and use these militia for the
enumerated national peace purposes
of executing the laws of the Union, to
suppress insurrection and repel in-
vasions. And to obviate the grave
defect and impotency in the National
Government of having to depend
upon the state militia in time of war,
the four enumerated war powers
were conferred without any limita-
tion whatever as to the extent of
those powers or the means by which
they were to be exercised.
Except for the purposes of the
Civil War, when President Lincoln
and the Congress did not hesitate to
adopt the conscription and enforced
draft, it has always been the policy
of the government to depend upon
the state militia for domestic pur-
poses and upon the volunteer system
for general war purposes. This policy
of the Government has been uniform-
ly criticised and condemned by mili-
tary men and writers on the military
unpreparedness of the United States.
And President Wilson in his public
speeches plainly pointed out the in-
adequacy of this policy in the present
world-war crisis, as a reason why the
Congress .hould enact the Conscrip-
tion Law. And yet, strange as it may
seem, these criticisms of the govern-
ment for adhering to such a policy
are cited as establishing the principle
that the Government is powerless to
raise an army by any other than the
militia and volunteer systems. This
furnishes the perfect example of the
boomerang in argument. Instead of
establishing the invalidity of the Con-
scription Act, these criticisms have
at last influenced Congress to exer-
cise its discretionary power of rais-
ing a national army by the more ade-
quate means of Conscription and
these military men and writers now
are approving the congressional
action.
We have no patience with the con-
tention for a construction of the con-
stitution that would make the United
States more impotent and inefficient
than it was under the Articles of
Confederation, and that would leave
it a pitiable and humiliating spectacle
in the gaze of the international world
-a sovereign nation shorn of its in-
herent power to wage war and raise
and support armies; to resist wanton
assaults upon' its sovereign rights,
and threatened destruction of its in-
stitutions; unable to defend its citi-
zens or to prevent the substitution of
an autocracy for the present glorious
freedom of its people. And yet we see
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this very contention emblazoned, by
a few, in speech and petition, with all
the fallacy, sophistry and vociferous-
ness of the demagogue. No wonder
the great Lincoln was stirred to real
eloquence and just wrath by the same
ill-timed and illogical contention
against the conscription act of the
Civil War that is urged against the
present act, to give expression to the
following opinion in support of the
power of Congress validly to enact
such a law. President Lincoln said:
"In this case, those who desire the
rebellion to succeed, and others who
seek reward in .a different way, are
very active in accommodating us with
this class of arguments. They tell us
the law is unconstitutional. It is the
first instance, I believe, in which the
power of Congress to do a thing has
ever been questioned in a case when
the power is given by the Constitu-
tion in express terms. Whether a
power can be implied when it is not
expressed has often been the subject
of controversy; but this is the first
case in which the degree of effrontery
has been ventured upon by denying a
power which is plainly and distinctly
written down in the Constitution.
The Constitution declares that 'the
Congress shall have power . . . to
raise and support armies; but no ap-
propriation of money to that use shall
be for a longer time than two years.'
The whole scope of the conscription
act is 'to raise and support armies.'
There is nothing else in it. . . . Do
you admit that the power is given to
raise and support armies, and yet in-
sist that by this act Congress has not
exercised the power in a constitu-
tional mode, has not done the thing in
the right way? Who is to judge that?
The Constitution gives Congress the
power, but it does not prescribe the
mode, or expressly declare who shall
prescribe it. In such case Congress
must prescribe the mode or relin-
quish the power. There is no alter-
native. . . . The power is given
fully, completely, unconditionally. It
is not a power to raise armies if state
authorities consent; nor if the men to
compose the armies are entirely will-
ing; but it is a power to raise and
support armies given to Congress by
the Constitution without an 'if.'....
The principle of the draft, which sim-
ply is involuntary or enforced ser-
vice, is not new. It has been prac-
ticed in all ages of the world. It was
well known to the framers of our
Constitution as one of the modes of
raising armies, at the time they
placed in that instrument the provi-
sion that 'the Congress shall have
power to raise and support armies'
Wherein is the peculiar hard-
ship now?"
The foregoing opinion was quoted
by Honorable Charles E. Hughes, late
Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, in his recent address before
the American Bar Association. Mr.
Hughes commented on this opinion as
follows: "These are the words of
Lincoln, penned in the midst of the
Civil War, in which conscription was
enforced, and his reasoning is con-
clusive. And while the question was
not presented to the United States
Supreme Court, the power of Con-
gress was explicitly recognized in
Tarbel's case. 13 Wall. 407,-20 L. Ed.
600, and in later opinions."
"To provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity" and "to
make the (United States and the)
world safe for democracy," the Con-
gress has recognized a state of war
existing against us and has enacted
the Conscription Law as the neces-
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sary means for raising and maintain-
ing an army to wage this war. If it
be said that these means resorted to
by Congress in the enforced draft,
and by the President as Commander
in Chief of the army in using our
forces to fight a foreign foe on for-
eign fields, are extraordinary means,
it must immediately be replied that
the conditions confronting us too are
extraordinary and cannot be met by
any other means. A war-mad mili-
tary autocracy, which can be com-
pared only to the very "Gates of
Hell" described by the Scriptures, is
trying to prevail against Christian-
ity, civilization and international law,
to impose upon us and the world
their military domination and to de-
stroy the constitutional democracy
which now is our glorious heritage.
We firmly believe that the sound
discretion exercised by Congress in
the adoption of the Conscription Act
as the means of raising an army for
use in the present world-war crisis
will be sustained by the United States
Supreme Court, just as such discre-
tionary right of Congress as to the
means to be used has always been
recognized in every important exer-
cise of its power under the Constitu-
tion. Witness the decisions sustain-
ing the National Bank Act, the Con-
fiscation Acts of the Civil War, the
Legal Tender Act, the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law and the Adamson Eight-
hour Law.
Would it not be a violation of the
fundamental principle of our institu-
tions, that one of the separate depart-
ments of the government shall not
usurp power committed by the Con-
stitution to another department, for
the Judiciary in this case to deny to
the Legislative Branch the war
powers and the discretionary means
of exercising them when they are ex.
pressly conferred upon The Congress
by the Constitution?
Are not these war powers and their
exercise by Congress, and the power
of the Executive, as Commander in
Chief of the Army, to fight on foreign
fields, political powers for which The
Congress and the President, respec-
tively, are answerable only to the peo-
ple,-political powers over which the
Judiciary can assume no jurisdiction
whatever?
We believe that the Judiciary will
be in unison with the Legislative and
Executive branches of the Govern-
ment in respect of these powers and
the means of their exercise; and that,
as a result, our country will emerge
from this national crisis and world-
war triumphant and victorious, with
the sun of American Democracy shin-
ing throughout the world more bril-
liantly than ever before, and with the
Flag of the United States floating
higher in the heavens, inspiring re-
newed love and patriotism in the peo-
ple at home and a lasting gratitude
and respect in the peoples abroad.
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CASE AND COMMENT
1. In Sprey vs. Kiser, 102 S. E.
708, the North Carolina court held a
druggist civilly responsible for the
death of a baby resulting from the
sale of a dangerous drug. The court
further held on the facts, that the
action was properly brought in con-
tract or tort. Generally speaking, a
druggist is liable for injuries to, or
death of a person, resulting from the
sale of dangerous drugs, -but the
liability rests upon the principle of
negligence. The druggist owes his
customers the legal obligation of
ordinary care in the sale of his pro-
ducts; but ordinary care is a relative
term. It means the highest degree of
care and caution consistent with the
conduct of the business. The decision
.n this case places druggists in the
legal category of public servants,
such as innkeepers and carriers, and
reflects a progressive tendency to ex-
tend the liability of all persons who
render service in any form to the
public, for all injuries resulting from
their negligent acts.
2. The Court of Appeals of
Georgia renders an interesting deci-
sion in the case of Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. vs. Hand, 102 S. E. 647,
wherein it is held that in an action on
an insurance policy the conviction of
insured for manslaughter did not
render inadmissible his evidence that
the death of the insured was acci-
dental. The court does not discuss
the principle at length nor cite any
authority in support of it. The ques-
tion involved here is disputed, how-
ever, by a few courts, but the decision
in the case is clearly sound. A judg-
ment of conviction in a criminal ac-
tFon is inadmissible to establish th
facts upon which it is based in a civil
action. It does not vary the rule of
law in this case that judgment was
sought to be contravterted as to those
facts. The proceedings are entirely
different and no rule of res adfudi-
tata sanctions the reciprocal admis-
sibility of civil and criminal judg-
ments for the reason that their pur-
poses differ, the procedure differs, the
rules of evidence differ and the pro-
ceedings do not affect the identical
parties. Those cases admitting a
criminal judgment as evidence in a
civil action are exceptional, as where
the civil action is based directly on
the judgment. The case is therefore
properly decided.
3. In Ellington vs. Rides, 102 S.
E. 510, the North Carolina Court held
that a person who installs a machine
on the premises of another is an in-
vitee and can hold the owner liable
for defective condition thereof even
though the injury results while the
plaintiff is doing an act not strictly
within the terms of the invitation.
The court said: "A slight departure
in the ordinary aberrations or casual-
ties of travel do nof change the rule
of liability and hence the protection
of the law is extended to him while
lawfully on that portion of the prem-
ises reasonably embraced within the
object of his visit." This decision is
questionable. An owner of premises
is liable for negligent condition
thereof only as long as the invitee
exercises the invitation strictly in ac-
cordance with its terms. This the
plaintiff failed to do in going to an-
other part of the property as the case
showed merely for curiosity and not
for a reason connected with the ob-
ject of his invitation. The instant,
therefore, he exceeded the terms of
his invitation the relation between
the Varties was suspended, he be-
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came a mere trespasser and should
bear the risks resulting from his own
misconduct.
4. Cobble vs. Royal, 219 S. W.
118, a Missouri case, was an action- to
recover on a mutual benefit insurance
certificate. In denying a recovery
the court held that a by-law, provid-
ing that proof of death can not be
based on the legal presumption of
death arising from seven years' ab-
sence and substituting a like rule
based on expectancy of life of in-
sured, was valid. The court gave as
its reason the fact that the seven
years' absence presumption is a mere
rule of evidence and can be abrogated
by contract. The case is intensely in-
structive and contains a valuable dis-
senting opinion. The decision, limit-
ing it to the facts, is sustainable. A
member of a society is conclusively
bound by all its by-laws pro.vided they
are legal and reasonable. There was
no contention in the case that it was
void because unreasonable, the only
argument being that it was illegal.
Now, a by-law is illegal if it violates
some principle of public policy
whether it be manifested by a statute
or by a common law rule. The seven
years' absence presumption is, as the
court stated, a mere rule of evidence
which can be abrogated by contract
and is not a rule of public policy like
a clause making decision of the so-
ciety conclusive. The destinction es-
tablished in the case is therefore valid
and is applied generally throughout
the law of contract. Rules of evi-
dence can be abrogated by contract,
but principles of public policy are
beyond the power of abrogation by
the parties.
5. Hurlbut vs. Bradley, 109 Atl.
171, a Connecticut case, holds that an
indorser of a note discharged by
failure of holder to give him notice of
dishonor, removes his liability by a
promise to pay the note. This is the
rule of the Law Merchant and under
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law. The decision is absolutely
sound. When an indorser is dis-
charged by failure to receive notice
of dishonor, the debt itself is not dis-
charged, but only the indorser is per-
sonally relieved from the obligation
to pay the note. When he'promises
to pay it therefore he waives the de-
fense that he would otherwise pos-
sess, revives the original obligation
and is liable as though notice of dis-
honor had been regularly given.
6. The recent Illinois case of Ford
vs. Greenwalt establishes an im-
portant precedent. The Supreme
Court held that where a will shows
by its terms that it was not intended
to be revoked by marriage of the tes-
tator, the intention is controlling and
the statutes does not revoke the will.
In other words the decision substan-
tially holds the statute is not an arbi-
trary rule of law, but is a mere rule
of evidence, the operation of which
can be avoided by appropriate testa-
mentary expression. The opinion of
the court, while not entirely logical,
is interesting, and no doubt properly
and reasonably construes the statute.
The statute as above stated provides
that if a single man makes a will his
subsequent marriage revokes it. The
policy of the statute is to induce him
by revoking his original will to make
a second will, thereby reconsidering
the provisions of the original instru-
ment, in view of the altered condi-
tions in person and property result-
ing from the marriage. But cessante
ratione, cessat lex: where the reason
for a law ceases to apply, the law it-
self no longer exists. Hence in this
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case since, when he made his will he
contemplated marriage, he considered
the changes it would create and nat-
urally it can be inferred that he
moulded the will to meet such post-
marital conditions. There was, there-
fore, no reason for holding the
statute applicable and court effectuat-
ing the clearly defined intention of
the testator, probated it as his last
will.
There are several miscellaneous
recent decisions on varied subjects in
the law . For instance, in Gibbs vs.
Almstone, 176 N. W. 173, the Minne-
sota court held that under -rule of
avoidable consequences, a person who
has sustained injury is not legally re-
quired to submit to an operation.
Again, in O'Connor vs. McCabe,
176 N. W .43, the South Dakota court
held that equity will reform a volun-
tary conveyance of realty in an action
between grantee and heirs at law of
grantor.
Lastly, in Elms vs. Flick, 126 N. E.
66, the Ohio court held, a father who
had provided an automobile for the
general use of the family, was not
liable for negligence of his son who
at time of injury was driving several
of his friends on a pleasure trip.
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PROSPECTUS AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE
COLLEGE OF LAW FOR 1920-1921.
With the year 1919-1920, the Col-
lege of Law of the University of No-
tre Dame began a new era. This
year, for the first time in the history
of the old school, the law men are
afforded a distinctive law building all
their own, and a law atmosphere
separate and apart from the other
schools and colleges. These features,
together with the splendid new and
modern equipment and facilities for
conducting the law course, lend dig-
nity to the School, offer singular ad-
vantages to the law students and
stimulate in them a zest for studying,
understanding and learning the law.
Nowhere in the country are these
conditions better.
The pictorial review of the school,
which appears in this issue of the Re-
porter, presents an external view of
the Hoynes College of Law, named
in honor of William Hoynds, Dean.
Emeritus, whose lifelong labors laid
the splendid foundation for the
present School of Law. A glimpse is
also given of each of the four large
rooms of the building, the library,
court room and class rooms.
LAW LIBRARY.
The law library, quite extensive
and adequate for the needs of our
large and growing law school, is con-
tinually augumented by the arrival
of new books. There are the U. S,
Supreme Court Reports, complete;
Federal Cases; Federal Reporter;
United States Statutes and Digests;
Meyers' Federal Decisions; The Na-
tional Reporter System, complete
With Digests; Lawyers' Reports An-
notated, both old and new series;
American Reporter system, Ameri-
can Decisions, American Reports,
American State Reports; English
Ruling Cases; British Ruling Cases;
American and English Annotated
Cases; American Annotated Cases;
Moak's English Reports; Peters-
dorf's Abridgment; American & Eng-
lish Corporation Cases; Moore's In-
ternational Law Digest; American &
English Encyc. of Law; Cyc., Ruling
Case Law, Words & Phrases; Encyc,
of Pleading & Practise; Encyc. of
Evidence; Standard Encyc. of Plead-
ing & Practise; hundreds of text
books, of the old and modern writers.
There are the Indiana Supreme and
Appellate Court Reports, complete;
New York Common-law Reports;
New York Court of Appeals Reports,
Vermont Reports.
There are now coming the state
reports of the individual states of
Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Wis-
consin, Minnesota, Pennsylvania
Massachusetts, Missouri, California
and Connecticut. Arrangements have
been made for acquiring the state re-
ports of all the states to the point
where the Reporter System begins to
publish them, and the Codes and
Statutes have also been applied for,
so that the law of every state will be
made available to every law student.
The library has a capacity of
twenty thousand volumes, is admir-
ably equipped with stacks, tables and
chairs, has high ceiling, is perfectly
lighted, day and night, and like the
court room and class rooms, is so ar-
ranged -and cared for as to afford the
most commodious, convenient and
cheerful accomodations for efficient
use.
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COURT ROOM.
The court room, which is a marvel
,of beauty and perfection, is con-
veniently located on the ground floor,
-opposite the law library. The court
,room, in its equipment, arrangement
-and faithful compliance with the re-
quisites of the actual court, is in fact
superior to many real court cham-
bers. Here are held the various ses-
sions of the University courts in the
strictest observance of the procedur-
al law,-pleading, practise and evi-
dence,-trial and appellate. We have
only to refer to the present issue of
the Notre Dame Law Reporter,
which, as an exhibit, speaks for it-
self, to confirm our statements.
A glimpse of the Notre Dame Cir-
cuit Court in session may be seen in
the accompanying pictorial review.
A pretentious bench for the judge,
perfect accomodations for the jury,
ample room at the bar for litigants
and their attorneys, witness box,
stenographer's table, and offices for
the clerk, sheriff and bailiff of the
court. The bar is raised and separ-
ated from the lobby, which has a
seating capacity of one hundred.
CLASS ROOMS.
The class rooms, like the court
room, are equipped with the beauti-
ful and substantial American, steel
pedestal, tablet arm chairs, the latest
word in modern lecture room ac-
comodation. One hundred and fifty
of these mahogany finished chairs arc
arranged in semi-circula r form in
front of the instructor's rostrum,
constituting such an efficient and at-
tractive spectacle as almost to speak
law for themselves. There are twe
such large rooms which together with
the court room, afford ample ac-
comodation for the large student
body and the entire faculty of the
School of Law.
ORGANIZATION AND SYSTEM.
The law faculty comprises six
resident instructors, all of whom are
graduates of the leading law schools
of the country, most of them ex-
perienced in the practice of law, and
three of whom have been regular
judges of city, and circuit courts.
Four of the faculty devote their en-
tire time and service to the School of
Law while the other members of the
faculty also engage in the law .prac-
tice.
The classes of the course are ar-
ranged in groups according to their
relationship and the logical order of
their study and with due regard to
the time to be devoted to each class
subject. These classes are assigned
to the various instructors with a view
to ,the instructor's special qualifica-
tion and experience to teach them.
The course is conducted under the
careful supervision of the dean of the
department to the end that the best
methods may be applied and the
highest degree of efficiency attained
in the teaching department, thereb-
assuring the students the greatest
possible measure of success in the
course.
A special advantage to the law stu-
dent at Notre Dame is his daily as-
sociation with the instructors and the
personal assistance rendered him and
the special interest taken in him by
the law faculty as well as by the ad.
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METHODS OF INSTRUCTION.
Experience at Notre Dame has
confirmed the opinions of eminent
law teachers that the case method
alone is not adequate to teach a
thorough and comprehensive know-
ledge of the law. Excellent as the
case method is for imparting a know-
ledge of the particular principles of
the law applicable in the cases ana-
lyzed, a general idea of the law as a
whole, its main features and its uni-
versal concepts can not be learned
without the aid of the text-book.
Therefore the law is taught here by
text-book assignments as well as
cases, both explained and illustrated
by the class-room talks of the in-
structors. In addition to these daily
assignments, frequent written tests
and the quarterly examinations arc
given, and class records are kept of
the students' work.
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF LAW.
As an introduction to the study of
law the students are given a course
of preliminary lectures to acquaint
them in a general way with the sys-
tem of law as a whole, its various
classifications and those concepts and
principles underlying the whole law
so necessary to an intelligent and
successful study of the various
branches of the law prescribed in the
course for study. These lectures
may be briefly outlined as follows:
the nature of law; law as it effects
the individual, organized society and,
nations; the system of American
jurisprudence; the common-law and
equity systems, their origin, develop-
ment and relation; our constitutional
and statutory law systems and their
relation to the common law; the
sources of the law, custom, judicial
decisions and legislation; judicial
systems and the processes of the
courts; higher court decisions as
precedents and the reporter system;
the law divided into two great
branches, the substantive law and the
law of procedure-rights and reme-
dies-and these branches again di-
vided respectively into the law of
contracts, wrongs and property and
practice, pleading and evidence ,these
in turn divided into the special
branches of the prescribed course;
where to find the law; how to study
the law.
THE LAW AND HOW TO PRAC-
TICE IT.
The lawyer's profession is a prac-
tical one and most law students in-
tend to practice the law. It is fre-
quently said of the law schools of the
country that their courses are not
practical, that they teach the sub-
stantive law to the exclusion of the
more practical branch of the law, the
law of procedure.
The substantive law operates pro-
prio vigore to establish the rights and
obligations of parties. When such
right is violated the substantive law
creates a secondary right which is
denominated a right of action. Then
it is that the law of procedure ap-
plies, and it is the knowledge of this
law that enables the practitioner to
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts
and the strong arm of the state to
secure his client's rights and re-
dress his wrongs. A law course.
therefore, to be practical should teach
not only the substantive law but alsc
the law of procedure.
To meet this condition the law
course as now prescribed at Notre
-- ....-------z
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Dame is intended not only to teach
the law but how to practice it as well,
Provision has been made for a sys-
tematic course in civil procedure ahd
a thorough and practical court sys-
tem to operate throughout the entire
three years of study.
COURSE OF PROCEDURE.
In addition to criminal procedure
which is taught in the first year
there is also a preliminary course in
civil procedure consisting of the
study of common-law and equity
courts, the original writs and pro-
cesses, the common-law forms of ac-
tion and remedies and relief in
equity. Not only does this serve as
a beginning of the course in practical
procedure but it enables the law stu-
dent from the outset to better under-
stand the substantive law taught
through the application of the corn
mon-law actions and remedies. This
course is followed in the second yeai
by a complete course of pleadings and
practice at common-law, the making
of issues in the various common-law
actions, equity pleading in general
and as applied in the federal courts,
and pleading and practice under the
code. The third year is devoted tc
the making of issues in the principal
civil actions under the code, trial
practice and appellate procedure.
The course in federal procedure is al-
so given in this year.
THE UNIVERSITY COURTS.
These consist of the Criminal Prac-
tise Court, -the University Moot
Court, the Notre Dame Circuit
Court and the Supreme Court of
Notre Dame. These courts constitute
a thorough and practical system And
are kept in operation throughout the
three years of the law course. The
Criminal Practise Court is open to
the first year law students for crimi-
nal pleading and practice immediate-
ly after the course in criminal law
and procedure. Hypothetical cases
are submitted to regularly chosen
grand juries and prosecuting attor-
neys-and indictments are voted and
returned. Warrants are issued, ar-
rests made and attorneys appointed
for the defendants. Motions to
quash are argued, pleas entered and
arguments made before the court and
jury on the question of conviction or
acquittal. Many hypothetical cases
are submitted to the students for the
preparation of affidavits and indict-
ments thereon and for argument in
the court. Thus all the students are
given a start in court practice in their
first year. The University Moot
Court is kept busy throughout the
junior year in the preparation and
argument of cases on the law ap-
plicable to hypothetical statements of
fact, principally in civil cases. When
the law of evidence is taught in
course of the second year the Notre
Dame Circuit Court opens, and here
the students apply all the law pro-
cedure, pleading, practice and evi-
dence. Throughout the senior year
practice is had with a view of teach-
ing the students how to make trial
records, save exceptions and avail
themselves of alleged error on ap-
peal to the Supreme Court. Each
candidate for a degree is required to
prepare at least one record and
transcript together with an assign-
ment of error and brief thereon in
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame.
These courts are all fully organiz-
ed, have their regular officers and
official records. Four students are
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assigned to each case and all are thus
made to engage in the active prac-
tice. It is thought that this system
of procedure and practice will so
qualify the graduate that he may
with confidence in himself begin the
active practice of his profession.
COURSES OF STUDY.
The prescribed course of study in
the Law School itself covers a period
of three years and leads to the De-
gree of Bachelor of Laws. An addi-
tional year of resident, graduate
work in the school merits the Degree
of Master of Laws. The require-
ments for the Degree of Doctor of
Laws or Doctor of Civil Laws are
prescribed by the University and the
College of Law upon proper applica-
tion therefor.
A six-year course has also been
arranged by which two degrees may
be acquired,--the degree from the
College of Arts or Science or Com-




Students who have a bachelor's de-
gree or who have completed at least
one year of college work, the equiva-
lent of thd courses prescribed in the
University, are eligible to enter the
three year course of law as candi-
dates for the degrees.
Graduates of a four year high
school or preparatory school of recog-
nized standing, evidenced by diploma
or certificate from such school, will
be admitted to he four-year course,
the first year of which consists of cer-
tain college subjects, some prescribed
and some elective and including the
elements of law.
Those who have not high school
graduation or certified credits equal
to those required for entrance into
the other colleges of the University,
may obtain such credits by examina-
tion in the subjects required, and may
acquire additional credits by taking
the courses outlined for the regular
school year and the summer school of
the University.
A few men of advanced age and
practical business or office experi-
ence, who are otherwise specially
qualified for the study of the law,
may apply to the University for ad-
mission as special students.
Students of other law schools will
be given such advanced rating in the
School of Law as warranted by the
character of the school from which,
they come and the certificate of
credits attained there. Only schools
of known repute and standing as
compare favorably with the College
of Law of the University of Notre
Dame will be recognized, whether
they be in or out of any association.






Study of Cases 18 1
Principles of Liability
and Damages 18 2
Common-law Actions 18 2
Contracts 18 5
Criminal Law & Procedure 18 2
Selected Reading 18 1
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Sales (8) Bailments (5) 13 5
Personal Property 5 5
Criminal Practice Court 18 1
Public Speaking 18 1
JUNIOR YEAR.
8 5 Equity and Trusts
10 5 Real Property, Mortgages,
18 5 Liens, Conveyancing
2 5 Bills & Notes
16 5 Insurance
18 3 Evidence
18 2 Code, Equity Pleading
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